We examine the role private equity (PE) sponsors play in the resolution of financial distress of portfolio companies. PE-backed firms have higher leverage and default at higher rates than other companies borrowing in leveraged loan markets. But, PE-backed firms restructure more quickly, avoid bankruptcy court more often, and liquidate less often compared to other highly leveraged firms experiencing financial distress. PE owners are also more likely to retain control post-restructuring, often by infusing capital as firms approach distress. While default frequencies are higher among PE-backed firms, PE investors appear to manage financial distress at lower cost compared to other owners.

This article provides the first causal estimates on the popular, cost-saving practice of diversion in the criminal justice system, an intervention that provides offenders with a second chance to avoid a criminal record. We exploit two natural experiments in Harris County, Texas where first-time felony defendants faced abrupt changes in the probability of diversion. Using administrative data and regression discontinuity methods, we find robust evidence across both experiments that diversion cuts reoffending rates in half and grows quarterly employment rates by nearly 50% over 10 years. The change in trajectory persists even 20 years out and is concentrated among young black men. An investigation of mechanisms strongly suggests that stigma associated with a felony conviction plays a key role in generating these results. Other possible mechanisms including changes in incarceration, other universal adjustments in policy or practice, and differences in criminal processing are ruled out empirically.

We analyze the out-of-sample performance of variables shown to forecast future mutual fund alphas. The degree of predictability, as measured by alpha spreads from quintile sorts or cross-sectional regression slopes, falls by at least half post-sample. These declines appear to be primarily the result of changes in the level of arbitrage activity in the market, with mutual fund competition appearing to play a secondary role. We find no evidence that the declines are the result of data snooping or learning by investors or fund managers. Finally, we show that corporate bond fund performance exhibits similar dependence on measures of bond market arbitrage activity.

When valuing a firm, investors must assess not only its expected future cash flows but also the systematic risk inherent in these cash flows. In this paper, we model the process by which investors may learn about firms' betas from earnings and how this learning process affects the relationship between earnings, announcement returns, and expected future returns. The model's main predictions are: (i) earnings response coefficients vary with macroeconomic conditions and are lower in upswings than downturns; (ii) earnings positively and negatively predict future returns in economic upswings and downturns, respectively, leading to return autocorrelation; and (iii) real earnings management rises in economic downturns and contributes to systematic risk in the economy. These predictions are directly attributable to investors' uncertainty regarding firms' exposures to systematic risk.

School policies that cause a large demand shift between public and private schooling may cause some private schools to enter or exit the market. We study how the policy effects differ under a fixed versus changing market structure in the context of a public school funding reform in New York City. We find evidence of a reduction in private schools in response to the reform. Using a model of demand for and supply of private schooling, we estimate that 20 percent of the reform’s effect on school enrollments came from increased private school exit and reduced private school entry.

We assume executives managing corporate financial policy consider the firm's current and target leverage, investment plans, anticipated cash flows, and consequences of alternative sequences of financing transactions, operating within efficient markets. Our analysis yields time-series and cross-sectional predictions for management of investment spending and leverage; use of maturity, priority, and convertibility covenants; and management of dividends, share repurchases, cash balances, and credit lines. Our evidence from 8608 SEOs covering 1970–2015 is consistent with implications of our theory, helps to resolve an array of issues in corporate finance, and offers a step toward a more unified analysis of rational corporate financial management.

Confidentially marketed public offers (CMPOs) represent a popular innovation in the market for seasoned equity offers (SEO) despite large negative announcement reactions. We find that CMPOs are often used by small firms with negative operating cash flows to raise a relatively substantial amount of capital, which is used largely for R&D intensive investments. We argue that the confidential marketing associated with CMPOs has made them a popular way for small firms to make fast-paced public offers, which are known to have reduced price pressure, while sidestepping the problem of inelastic demand. These firms are willing to trade off more negative announcement reactions for the chance to privately assess their prospects for raising capital.

In the standard herding model, privately informed individuals sequentially see prior actions and then act. An identical action herd eventually starts and public beliefs tend to “cascade sets” where social learning stops. What behaviour is socially efficient when actions ignore informational externalities? We characterize the outcome that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities. Our four key findings are: (1) cascade sets shrink but do not vanish, and herding should occur but less readily as greater weight is attached to posterity. (2) An optimal mechanism rewards individuals mimicked by their successor. (3) Cascades cannot start after period one under a signal log-concavity condition. (4) Given this condition, efficient behaviour is contrarian, leaning against the myopically more popular actions in every period. We make two technical contributions: as value functions with learning are not smooth, we use monotone comparative statics under uncertainty to deduce optimal dynamic behaviour. We also adapt dynamic pivot mechanisms to Bayesian learning.

We use hand-collected data from acquisition press releases to investigate how acquisition experience affects the career outcomes of non-CEO senior managers. To address the non-random nature of gaining experience, we separately use manager and firm-year fixed effects, as well as an instrumental variable analysis. Acquisition experience is positively related to compensation, the likelihood of a future board seat, and the likelihood of promotion to chief executive officer. Further tests suggest that the effects of experience decay over time, have diminishing returns, and do not depend on deal quality. Finally, we search Securities and Exchange Commission filings to document novel information on managerial roles in mergers and acquisitions.

We examine the extent to which directors with supply chain experience (DSCs) on corporate boards create informational advantages that improve strategies and outcomes related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Our results suggest that DSCs play a dual role by motivating value-enhancing acquisitions while simultaneously deterring value-destroying ones. The nature and extent of these effects depend on such factors as the size of the acquiring firm and the level of uncertainty in its operating environment. Furthermore, we find that DSCs are positively associated with abnormal announcement returns. Acquirers with at least one DSC outperform their counterparts without DSCs by 3.1% during a three-day window around the announcement. Our results hold after we address endogeneity concerns using multiple methods. Finally, we show that acquirer board representation by DSCs is positively related to post-merger operating performance and negatively related to the premium paid for the target.