Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, was designed to prohibit disclosure of material private information to selected market participants. The informational advantage such select participants gain is unclear. If multiple “insiders” receive identical information, private information is immediately incorporated in price and each insider has zero expected profit. If, on the other hand, Regulation FD has curtailed the flow of information from firms, private information becomes longer‐lived and more valuable. Hence, market makers will demand increased compensation by widening the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread. We identify the cost components of the bid‐ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. Controlling for other factors affecting the spread, we find that adverse selection costs increase approximately 36% after Regulation FD. We interpret our finding as Regulation FD failing to achieve one of its desired objectives

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations

Rules implemented by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003 impose additional disclosure and filing requirements on firms publicly disclosing non-GAAP earnings. We find the regulations produced (1) modest declines in the frequency of special- and other-item exclusions, (2) a decline in exclusion magnitude, (3) a modest decline in the probability disclosed earnings meet or beat forecasts, and (4) a decline in the association between returns and forecast errors. Our results suggest that, while the regulations reduced firms’ use of non-GAAP disclosures to improve performance perceptions, they also reduced firms’ willingness to use non-GAAP earnings to convey permanent earnings

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital

The IIF's Committee on Market Best Practices has been working on five subjects: (1) Risk management, realignment of incentives is necessary; (2) Ratings, an SRO for CRAs is proposed; (3) Valuations, more dialogue on processes; (4) Disclosure, some new initiatives; (5) Liquidity risk, a review is in hand. Regulation's enforcement intensity is not a good measure of effectiveness; instead a more supervisory, risk-based approach is desirable. There is a need for a framework of mutual recognition in the context of cross-border regulation, with greater use of colleges of supervisors. Within Europe a start would involve putting the Level 3 Committees onto a stronger legal basis

This paper applies the institutional concepts of resource dependence, power, resistance, and dramaturgical exchange to the legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, internal control proposals and regulations from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, and the internal control requirements under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The analysis documents that from 1976 to 2001 powerful organizations and individuals employed active strategies of avoidance, defiance, and manipulation to successfully defeat proposals that would have required all public companies to assess and publicly report on their internal controls over financial reporting. During this same period, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) vacillated between actively advocating mandatory internal control reporting and passively acquiescing to industry and White House demands for voluntary internal control reporting. The resulting dramaturgical exchange between the SEC and its regulatees made it appear as if the voluntary initiatives were reasonably effective, but subsequent accounting and financial scandals challenged this view and eventually precipitated mandatory internal control assessment and reporting. The paper also considers how the ongoing dramaturgical exchange between regulators and regulatees could significantly weaken the internal control requirements of SOX (2002) [Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (2002). Public Law 107–204, 116 Stat. 745], and discusses implications for future research and recent critiques of neoinstitutional theory

We examine the design of asset revaluation policies in settings where a regulator can mandate fair value disclosure in order to mitigate a lemons problem in the asset resale market. The welfare-maximizing policy generally prescribes fair value certification for the lower asset values and (less costly) historical cost reporting for the higher asset values. The potential for voluntary certification can reduce welfare by increasing equilibrium certification costs and promoting underinvestment in socially valuable projects. Thus, a single regulated source of information (mandated disclosure) can be preferable to two sources of information (mandated and voluntary disclosure

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states

We assess the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on the trading behavior of transient institutional investors in the quarter prior to a bad news break in a string of consecutive earnings increases. Bad news breaks are defined as breaks that are by growth firms, preceded by longer strings of consecutive earnings increases, followed by longer strings of consecutive earnings decreases, and associated with larger declines in earnings. Pre–Reg FD transient institutions have abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter immediately preceding a bad news break. This abnormal selling is confined to firms that hold conference calls in the pre–Reg FD period. However, in the post–Reg FD period transient institutions do not exhibit similar abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter before a bad news break. Furthermore, after Reg FD transient institutions allocate less of their stock portfolios to conference call firms relative to non–conference call firms in the quarters prior to a bad news break. These results demonstrate that Reg FD has had an impact on management's selective disclosure behavior and significantly changed the trading behavior of transient institutions

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers