A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 2,385 resources
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We characterize the unique equilibrium in an economy populated by strategic CARA investors who trade multiple risky assets with arbitrarily distributed payoffs. We use our explicit solution to study the joint behavior of illiquidity of option contracts. Option bid-ask spreads are proportional to risk aversion and risk-neutral variances of option payoffs. Spreads may decrease in risk aversion, physical variance, open interest, and increase after earnings announcements in a result contrary to conventional wisdom. All these predictions are confirmed empirically using a large panel data set of U.S. stock options.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We investigate the strategic role of a recommender who cares about accuracy and whose recommendations influence product quality. In the presence of such feedback effects, recommendations have a self-fulling property: the recommendation agent can select any firm that will end up being the firm with the best quality. This produces important inefficiencies that include (a) a lack of incentive to acquire valuable information, (b) a status quo bias, and (c) the avoidance of risky innovations. Monetary payments from firms may work in mitigating these inefficiencies, while competition between recommenders and monetary payments from consumers are ineffective.
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We study capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. A novel general equilibrium channel that operates through firms deposits mitigates the cost of increasing capital requirements. In the calibrated model, (a) the optimal capital requirement is 7.3 percentage points higher than in a comparable model in which all the deposits are held by households, and (b) setting the capital requirement higher than the true optimum is not as costly as one would gauge from the comparable model. We also provide some independent evidence that supports our novel channel.
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Postcrisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from nonbank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business activities toward matchmaking. Thus, postcrisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.
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We study the interaction between noisy demand and skewed asset payoffs. In our model, price as a function of quantities is convex in a neighborhood around zero if and only if skewness is positive. The combination of convexity and noise produces the idiosyncratic skewness effect, a documented negative relationship between an asset’s idiosyncratic skewness and its expected return. We further offer an explanation for the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Finally, our theory predicts that higher idiosyncratic skewness strengthens the idiosyncratic volatility effect (and vice versa). We find support for this prediction in the cross-section of stock returns.
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We provide new evidence that disruptions in firms’ access to credit during the Global Financial Crisis significantly affected product innovation in the consumer goods sector. We combine highly granular retail scan data with lending data and find that credit-constrained firms introduced fewer new products, those products were less novel, and new products sold less well. Overall, these findings suggest that disruptions to credit markets impair firms’ ability to compete for profits through new product offerings.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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Between March and August 2020, S&P and Moody’s downgraded approximately 25% of collateral feeding into CLOs and only 2% of tranche values, with rating actions concentrating in junior tranches. Both S&P and Moody’s modeling indicate that the impacts should have been considerably larger, especially for higher-rated tranches. Neither changes in correlation nor the accumulation of pre-COVID-19 protective cushions can explain the downgrade asymmetry on upper tranches. Instead, CLO managers repositioned their collateral pools to dampen the negative credit shock and rating agencies incorporated qualitative adjustments in their CLO ratings. Important potential policy and market implications from these findings are discussed.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We study the relation between trade credit, asset prices, and production-network linkages. Empirically, firms extending more trade credit earn 7.6 p.a. lower risk premiums and maintain longer relationships with customers. Using a production-based model, we quantitatively explain these novel facts. Trade credit reduces the departure probability of high-quality customers, thereby reducing firms’ exposures to systematic costs incurred in finding new customers. The mechanism predicts that the aggregate amount of trade credit proxies for customer-search costs and that suppliers with shorter-duration links to customers command higher expected returns. We confirm these and other novel predictions in the data.
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We introduce a real-time measure of conditional biases to firms’ earnings forecasts. The measure is defined as the difference between analysts’ expectations and a statistically optimal unbiased machine-learning benchmark. Analysts’ conditional expectations are, on average, biased upward, a bias that increases in the forecast horizon. These biases are associated with negative cross-sectional return predictability, and the short legs of many anomalies contain firms with excessively optimistic earnings forecasts. Further, managers of companies with the greatest upward-biased earnings forecasts are more likely to issue stocks. Commonly used linear earnings models do not work out-of-sample and are inferior to those analysts provide.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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We assess how investors’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for sustainable investments responds to the social impact of those investments, using a framed field experiment. While investors have a substantial WTP for sustainable investments, they do not pay significantly more for more impact. This also holds for dedicated impact investors. When investors compare several sustainable investments, their WTP responds to relative, but not to absolute, levels of impact. Regardless of investments’ impact, investors experience positive emotions when choosing sustainable investments. Our findings suggest that the WTP for sustainable investments is primarily driven by an emotional, rather than a calculative, valuation of impact.
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Journals
Topic
- Bond (211)
- CEO (63)
- Director (39)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (37)
- Capital Structure (31)
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- Journal Article (2,385)
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