A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 238 resources
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This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary, rather than coerced, activity of the followers. This paper considers how a leader induces rational agents to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead them. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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The authors develop a positive theory of how interest-group competition shapes the organization of Congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services. Since interest groups cannot enforce fee-for-service contracts with legislators, legislators have an incentive to create specialized, standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members. The resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests. Contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory, which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Subjective uncertainty is characterized by ambiguity if the decisionmaker has an imprecise knowledge of the probabilities of payoff-relevant events. In such an instance, subjective beliefs are better represented by a set of probability functions than by a unique probability function. An ambiguity-averse decisionmaker adjusts his choice on the side of caution in response to his imprecise knowledge of the odds. This paper shows that ambiguity aversion can explain the existence of incomplete contracts. The contextual setting is the investment hold-up model which has been the focus of much of the research on incomplete contracts. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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The government's incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade-off between political benefits and economic costs, the latter depending on the decentralization of government. Two effects of federalism are derived: first, fiscal competition among local governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and, thus, serves as a commitment device (the 'competition effect'); second, monetary centralization, together with fiscal decentralization, induces a conflict of interests and, thus, may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation (the 'checks and balance effect'). The authors' analysis is used to interpret China's recent experience of transition to a market economy. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise. The dominant firm's advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher prices on social welfare. Whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration. A vertical merger is similar to a hypothetical horizontal merger, suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry should be similar to horizontal merger policy. The dominant firm model yields an observable sufficient indicator of welfare-improving vertical mergers. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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This paper presents a simple R&D-driven endogenous growth model to shed light on some puzzling economic trends. The model can account for why patent statistics have been roughly constant even though R&D employment has risen sharply over the last thirty years. The model also illuminates why steadily increasing R&D effort has not led to any upward trend in economic growth rates, as is predicted by earlier R&D-driven endogenous growth models with the 'scale effect' property. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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This article studies how equity ownership and corporate control were separated in the United States. Initially, railroads and industrial firms were tightly controlled by a few shareholders; this situation was altered in the 1890s by massive mergers and reorganizations, which allowed private banks to control railroads and industrial firms. Between 1912 and 1939, bank control faded away as a result of a political reaction against financial institutions. Using stock-market data from 1914, the author shows that the eviction of banks from corporate boards depressed firm values by about 7 percent and that part of this value came from cartelization. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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The authors study the relationship between asset prices and herd behavior, which occurs when traders follow the trend in past trades. When traders have private information on only a single dimension of uncertainty (the effect of a shock to the asset value), price adjustments prevent herd behavior. Herding arises when there are two dimensions of uncertainty (the existence and effect of a shock), but it need not distort prices because the market discounts the informativeness of trades during herding. With a third dimension of uncertainty (the quality of traders' information), herd behavior can lead to a significant, short-run mispricing. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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