A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 238 resources
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If child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents' concern for the household's survival, the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force. However, this assumption about parental decision making, coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor, could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market, with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work. The paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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The author considers trade between a flexible-wage America and a rigid-wage Europe. In a benchmark case, a move from autarky to free trade doubles European unemployment. American wages rise to the European level. Entry of the unskilled 'South' to world markets raises European unemployment. Europe's commitment to the high wage wholly insulates America from the shock. Immigration to America raises American income, but lowers European income dollar for dollar, while European unemployment rises. Absent South-North migration of the unskilled from 1970-90, Europe could have maintained the same wage with from one-eighth to one-fourth less unemployment. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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The authors construct a rational expectations model in which the economy switches stochastically between periods of low and high growth. When agents expect growth to be slow, the returns on investment are low and little investment takes place. But if agents expect fast growth, investment is high, returns are high, and growth is rapid. This expectational indeterminacy is induced by monopolistic competition and complementarity between different types of capital goods. Neither externalities nor increasing returns to scale are required. The equilibrium with growth cycles is stable under the dynamics implied by a simple learning rule. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Holdouts (the continuation of negotiations beyond the contract expiry date) are the most common form of disputes in labor contract negotiations. The authors model holdouts as a delaying tactic employed by unions to obtain information about other bargaining outcomes in their industry. Novel implications of their model include a positive association between holdout duration and the number of bargaining pairs negotiating contracts simultaneously; bunching of holdout durations within these 'negotiating groups'; and fewer strikes among holdouts which end later in groups. Using a large panel of contract negotiations in Canadian manufacturing, the authors find considerable support for these predictions. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Do well-functioning stock markets and banks promote long-run economic growth? This paper shows that stock market liquidity and banking development both positively predict growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvements when entered together in regressions, even after controlling for economic and political factors. The results are consistent with the views that financial markets provide important services for growth and that stock markets provide different services from banks. The paper also finds that stock market size, volatility, and international integration are not robustly linked with growth and that none of the financial indicators is closely associated with private saving rates. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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The authors use a two-period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling. Unraveling provides insurance in the absence of complete markets but causes inefficient assignments. Unraveling is more likely the smaller the applicant pool, the smaller the proportion of more-promising applicants, and the greater the heterogeneity in the pool. Banning early contracts hurts firms and benefits less-promising applicants; the effects on more-promising applicants depend on how the gains from early contracts are shared. Ex post buyouts eliminate inefficient assignments and more-promising applicants always unravel. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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Many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance, yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it. This paper incorporates such pay, with the following results. Performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and qualified workers in short supply. More capital-intensive industries pay more than less capital-intensive industries, as observed in studies of interindustry wages differentials. Sustaining an efficient outcome requires a social convention similar to the notion of a fair wage. The model also makes predictions about the relationship between turnover, wages, growth, and unemployment. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
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