A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Levinson, A. (2009). Technology, International Trade, and Pollution from US Manufacturing. American Economic Review, 99, 2177–2192.

  Pollution emitted by US manufacturers declined markedly over the past several decades, even as real manufacturing output increased. I first show that most of the decline in US manufacturing pollution has resulted from changing production processes ("technology"), rather than changes in the mix of goods produced. I then show that increased net imports of polluting goods ("international trade") accounts for only a small portion of thepollution reductions from the changing mix of goods. Together, these two findings demonstrate that shifting polluting industries overseas explains only a minor part – less than 10 percent – of the cleanup of US manufacturing. (JEL F18, L23, L60, O30, Q52, Q53)

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• Lorenzoni, G. (2009). A Theory of Demand Shocks. American Economic Review, 99, 2050–2084.

  This paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumerexpectations regarding aggregate productivity. Agents are hit by heterogeneousproductivity shocks, they observe their own productivity and a noisy publicsignal regarding aggregate productivity. The public signal gives rise to "noiseshocks," which have the features of aggregate demand shocks: they increaseoutput, employment, and inflation in the short run and have no effects in thelong run. Numerical examples suggest that the model can generate sizableamounts of noise-driven volatility. (JEL D83, D84, E21, E23, E32)

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• Matsusaka, J. G. (2009). Direct Democracy and Public Employees. American Economic Review, 99, 2227–2246.

  In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but notemployment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)

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• Mendelsohn, R., & Muller, N. Z. (2009). Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right. American Economic Review, 99, 1714–1739.

  This paper argues for efficient environmental regulations that equate the marginaldamage of pollution to marginal abatement costs across space. The paperestimates the source-specific marginal damages of air pollution and calculatesthe welfare gain from making the current sulfur dioxide allowance trading programfor power plants more efficient. The savings from using trading ratiosbased on marginal damages are between 310 and 940 million per year. Thepotential savings from setting aggregate emissions efficiently and from includingmore sources of air pollution are many times higher. (JEL H23, Q53, Q58)

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• Oberholzer-Gee, F., & Waldfogel, J. (2009). Media Markets and Localism: Does Local News en Español Boost Hispanic Voter Turnout? American Economic Review, 99, 2120–2128.

  In the past decade Americans have increasingly turned their attention to nonlocal information sources, raising concerns about disengagement from local communities. Regulation sometimes seeks to curtail the integration of media markets through the promotion of "localism." This paper examines the role of local media. We make use of the rapid growth of Hispanic communities in the United States to test whether the presence of local television news affects local civic behavior. We find that Hispanic voter turnout increased by 5 to 10 percentage points, relative to non-Hispanic turnout, in markets where Spanish-language local television news became available. (JEL D72, J15, L82)

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• Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. N. (2009). Surprised by the Parimutuel Odds? American Economic Review, 99, 2129–2134.

  Empirical analyses of parimutuel betting markets have documented that market probabilities of favorites (longshots) tend to underestimate (overestimate) the corresponding empirical probabilities. We argue that this favorite-longshot bias is consistent with bettors taking simultaneous positions on the basis of private information about the likelihood of different outcomes. The ex post realization of a high market probability indicates favorable information about the occurrence of an outcome – and the opposite is true for longshots. This explanation for the bias relies on the bettors' inability to incorporate the surprise revealed by the final odds. (JEL D81, D82, L83)

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• Robson, A. J., & Samuelson, L. (2009). The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 99, 1925–1953.

  We examine the evolutionary foundations of intertemporal preferences. Whenall the risk affecting survival and reproduction is idiosyncratic, evolution selectsfor agents who maximize the discounted sum of expected utility, discounting atthe sum of the population growth rate and the mortality rate. Aggregate uncertaintyconcerning survival rates leads to discount rates that exceed the sum ofpopulation growth rate and death rate, and can push agents away from exponentialdiscounting. (JEL D11, D81, D91)

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• Sutter, M. (2009). Individual Behavior and Group Membership: Comment. American Economic Review, 99, 2247–2257.

  Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership has a strong effect on individual decisions in strategic games when group membership is salient through payoff commonality. In this comment, I show that their findings also apply to nonstrategic decisions, even when no outgroup exists, and I relate the effects of group membership on individual decisions to joint decision making in teams. I find in an investment experiment that individual decisions with salient group membership are largely the same as team decisions. This finding bridges the literature on team decision making and on group membership effects. (JEL D71, D82, Z13)

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• Young, H. P. (2009). Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning. American Economic Review, 99, 1899–1924.

  New ideas, products, and practices take time to diffuse, a fact that is oftenattributed to some form of heterogeneity among potential adopters. This paperexamines three broad classes of diffusion models – contagion, social influence,and social learning – and shows how to incorporate heterogeneity intoeach at a high level of generality without losing analytical tractability. Eachtype of model leaves a characteristic "footprint" on the shape of the adoptioncurve which provides a basis for discriminating empirically between them. Theapproach is illustrated using the classic study of Ryan and Gross (1943) on thediffusion of hybrid corn. (JEL D83, O33, Q16, Z13)

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• Angrist, J., & Lavy, V. (2009). The Effects of High Stakes High School Achievement Awards: Evidence from a Randomized Trial. American Economic Review, 99, 1384–1414.

  The Israeli matriculation certificate is a prerequisite for most postsecondaryschooling. In a randomized trial, we attempted to increase certification ratesamong low-achievers with cash incentives. The experiment used a school-basedrandomization design offering awards to all who passed their exams in treatedschools. This led to a substantial increase in certification rates for girls but hadno effect on boys. Affected girls had a relatively high ex ante chance of certification.The increase in girls' matriculation rates translated into an increasedlikelihood of college attendance. Female matriculation rates increased partlybecause treated girls devoted extra time to exam preparation. (JEL I21, I28,J16)

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