A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 419 resources
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Crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closelymonitored. We study the role of information in crises by introducing a financialmarket in a coordination game with imperfect information. The asset price aggregatesdispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal. In contrast tothe case with exogenous information, our main result is that uniqueness may notobtain as a perturbation from perfect information: multiplicity is ensured with smallnoise. In addition, we show that: (a) multiplicity may emerge in the financial priceitself; (b) less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when theequilibrium is unique; and (c) similar results obtain for a model where individualsobserve one another?s actions, highlighting the importance of endogenous informationmore generally. (JEL D53, D82, D83)
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Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling foraggregation effects, varying utilization of capital and labor, nonconstant returns,and imperfect competition. On impact, when technology improves, input use andnonresidential investment fall sharply. Output changes little. With a lag of severalyears, inputs and investment return to normal and output rises strongly. Thestandard one-sector real-business-cycle model is not consistent with this evidence.The evidence is consistent, however, with simple sticky-price models, which predictthe results we find: when technology improves, inputs and investment generally fallin the short run, and output itself may also fall. (JEL E22, E32, O33)
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We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individualaltruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards orpunishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motivefor which good deeds are performed, and this ?overjustification effect? can inducea partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. Wealso identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, moregenerally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which weshow depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputationalconcern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and howmonopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shownto potentially reduce social welfare. (JEL D11, D64, D82, Z13)
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We examine administrative data on young German workers and their employers tostudy the long-term effects of an early career job loss. To account for nonrandomsorting of workers into firms with different turnover rates and for selective jobmobility, we use changes over time in firm- and age-specific labor demand as aninstrument for displacement. We find that wage losses of young job losers areinitially 15 percent, but drop to zero within five years. Only workers leaving verylarge establishments suffer persistent losses. A comparison of estimators impliesthat initial sorting, negative selection, and voluntary job mobility biases ordinaryleast squares estimates toward finding permanent negative effects of early displacements.(JEL J13, J23, J24, J62, J63, M53)
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Mixing across racial and ethnic lines could spur understanding or inflame tensions between groups. We find that white students at a large state university randomly assigned African American roommates in their first year were more likely to endorse affirmative action and view a diverse student body as essential for a high-quality education. They were also more likely to say they have more personal contact with, and interact more comfortably with, members of minority groups. Although sample sizes are too small to provide definitive evidence, these results suggest students become more empathetic with the social groups to which their roommates belong. (JEL I28, J15, J18, Z13)
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Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, the WorldTrade Organization members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals.In this paper we empirically investigate the welfare effects of thisrequirement on developing countries using data for the fluoroquinolones subsegmentof the systemic anti-bacterials segment of the Indian pharmaceuticals market.Our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects ofTRIPS may have some basis. We estimate that the withdrawal of all domesticproducts in this subsegment is associated with substantial welfare losses to theIndian economy, even in the presence of price regulation. The overwhelming portionof this welfare loss derives from the loss of consumer welfare. (JEL F13, L65, O34)
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Despite much work, economists have not been able to quantitatively account for the differences in the Japanese and U.S. saving rates after World War II. In this paper, we show that the use of actual Japanese total factor productivity growth rates in a standard growth model generates saving rates that are reasonably similar to the Japanese data between 1956 and 2000. (JEL E21, E22, O41, O47)
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I show existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model. I derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ) in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to wage elasticity and degree of complementarity between consumption and labor. I bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies across states. Using labor supply elasticity estimates, I find a mean estimate of γ ≈ 1, then show generating γ > 2 requires that wage increases cause sharper labor supply reductions. (JEL D81 J22 )
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This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects? initial responses to 16dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announcedexcept for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given freeaccess. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behaviorimplied by leading decision rules. Subjects? decisions and searches show that mostsubjects understood the games and sought to maximize payoffs, but many hadsimplified models of others? decisions that led to systematic deviations from equilibrium.The predictable component of their deviations is well explained by astructural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on level-k thinking. (JELC72, C92, D83)
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