A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 4,062 resources
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This reply refutes the objection raised by Levy (2009) about the fit of the upper tail of the city size distribution in Eeckhout (2004). I show that the method on which his conclusion is based is unsubstantiated. The visual interpretation of the fit on log-log plots is misleading. In addition, the methodology used to estimate a truncated subsample of the distribution while testing its significance against a distribution with prespecified parameters is ill-founded. The main conclusion is that Gibrat's law holds: city sizes follow proportionate growth, thus giving rise to a lognormal size distribution, tail included. (JEL R11, R12, R23)
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We study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create. We show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits, since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals. Instead, once a run is underway, (benevolent) government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals, placing further strain on the banking system. When depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals, their incentive to participate in the run increases. In fact, ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self-fulfilling run to occur. (JEL G21, G8)
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We study an allocation problem where a set of objects needs to be allocated to agents arriving over time. The basic model is of the private, independent values type. The dynamically efficient allocation is implementable if the distribution of agents' values is known. Whereas lack of knowledge about the distribution is inconsequential in the static case, endogenous informational externalities arise if the designer gradually learns about the distribution by observing present values. These externalities may prevent the implementation of the dynamically efficient allocation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficient allocation to be implementable. (JEL D11, D82)
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We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjectsprivately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with thecommon investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separatelyconsider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight todelay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash,cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes acrossour experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistentwith belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rationalrules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fitthan quantal response equilibrium. (JEL C72, D82, D83, G11)
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Aggregate and sectoral comovement are central features of business cycles, sothe ability to generate comovement is a natural litmus test for macroeconomicmodels. But it is a test that most models fail. We propose a unified model thatgenerates aggregate and sectoral comovement in response to contemporaneousand news shocks about fundamentals. The fundamentals that we consider areaggregate and sectoral total factor productivity shocks as well as investment-specifictechnical change. The model has three key elements: variable capitalutilization, adjustment costs to investment, and preferences that allow us toparameterize the strength of short-run wealth effects on the labor supply. (JELE13, E20, E32)
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Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-ridingtendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in socialdilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, theendogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoreticalanalysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium,including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirmsthat institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and groupwelfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Playersare unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players havethe opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in theinstitution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)
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Jan Eeckhout (2004) reports that the empirical city size distribution is lognormal, consistent with Gibrat's Law. We show that for the top 0.6 percent of the largest cities, the empirical distribution is dramatically different from the lognormal, and follows a power law. This top part is extremely important as it accounts for more than 23 percent of the population. The empirical hybrid lognormal-power-law distribution revealed may be characteristic of other key distributions, such as the wealth distribution and the incomedistribution. This distribution is not consistent with a simple Gibrat proportionate effect process, and its origin presents a puzzle yet to be answered. (JEL R11, R12, R23)
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Many classes of assets are illiquid or nonmarketable in that they cannot alwaysbe traded immediately. Thus, a portfolio position in these becomes at least temporarilyirreversible. We study the asset-pricing implications of this type ofilliquidity in an exchange economy with heterogeneous agents. In this market,one asset is always liquid. The other asset can be traded initially, but then notagain until after a "blackout" period. Illiquidity has a dramatic effect. Agentsabandon diversification and choose polarized portfolios instead. The value ofliquidity can represent a large portion of the equilibrium price of an asset. (JELG11, G12)
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This paper provides a simple and empirically plausible model of artworks as investment vehicles. It reconciles the observation that average financial returns for collectibles are low and volatile with the theory of consumption-based asset pricing. Art assets are appealing both for their ability to transfer consumption over time and for their use as signals of wealth, as in the literature on the demand for luxuries. Adding art value to utility, returns also reflect this "conspicuous consumption" dividend; as a result, average financial returns are low. Risk premia for artworks are predicted to be modest or even negative. (JEL G11, Z11)
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We analyze models with interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneousjurisdictions, such as CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Eachjurisdiction's emissions depend upon the local stock of capital, which is interjurisdictionallymobile and subject to local taxation. In important cases,decentralized policy-making leads to efficient resource allocation, even in thecomplete absence of corrective interventions by higher-level governments orcoordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even whenthe preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralizedsystem can result in globally efficient allocation. (JEL D62, H23, H73,H87, Q58)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (1,932)
- Journal of Finance (783)
- Journal of Financial Economics (773)
- Review of Financial Studies (574)
Topic
- Bond (133)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (63)
- CEO (58)
- Director (31)
- Capital Structure (22)
Resource type
- Journal Article (4,062)