A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 485 resources
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The homes of firm owners are an important source of finance for ongoing businesses. We use UK microdata to show that a £1 increase in the value of the homes of a firm's directors increases the firm's investment by £0.03. This effect is concentrated among firms whose directors' homes are valuable relative to the firm's assets, that are financially constrained, and that have directors who are personally highly levered. An aggregation exercise shows that directors' homes are as important as corporate property for collateral driven fluctuations in aggregate investment demand.
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We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.
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This paper proposes a flexible-price theory of the role of money in an economy with incomplete idiosyncratic risk sharing. When the risk premium goes up, money provides a safe store of value that prevents interest rates from falling, reducing investment. Investment is too high during booms when risk is low, and too low during slumps when risk is high. Monetary policy cannot correct this: money is superneutral and Ricardian equivalence holds. The optimal allocation requires the Friedman rule and a tax/subsidy on capital. The real effects of money survive even in the cashless limit.
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We estimate the price effect of US import restrictions on washers. The 2012 and 2016 antidumping duties against South Korea and China were accompanied by downward or minor price movements along with production relocation to other export platform countries. With the 2018 tariffs, on nearly all source countries, the price of washers increased nearly 12 percent. Interestingly, the price of dryers—not subject to tariffs—increased by an equivalent amount. Factoring in dryer prices and price increases by domestic brands, the 2018 tariffs on washers imply a tariff elasticity of consumer prices of above one.
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We develop an endogenous network formation model, in which agents form connections to acquire information. Our model features complementarity in actions as agents care not only about accuracy of their decision-making but also about the actions of other agents. In equilibrium, the information structure is a hierarchical network, and, under weakly convex cost of forming links, the equilibrium network is core-periphery. Although agents are ex ante identical, there is ex post heterogeneity in payoffs and actions.
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The experimental method not only helps identify causal relationships, but also provides economists with a rich sense of context, focuses research on specific practical questions, stimulates collaboration with practitioners and specialists from other fields, and allows for rapid iteration. In this lecture, I present a series of examples illustrating how together these features make the experimental approach a powerful tool for advancing scientific understanding, informing policy, and promoting innovation. I then discuss how institutions can be designed to accelerate innovation and direct it toward the world's most pressing needs.
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We study the impact of vertical integration on pricing incentives in multiproduct industries. To do so, we exploit recent variation in vertical structure in the US carbonated-beverage industry. While the elimination of double marginalization with vertical integration is normally characterized as procompetitive, economic theory predicts that it may cause anticompetitive price increases in multiproduct industries. We indeed find that vertical integration causes price decreases in products with eliminated double margins but price increases in the other products sold by the integrated firm. These results provide new evidence of anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers.
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We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. A long-term contract governs the stage games that the contracting parties will play in the future (depending on verifiable stage-game outcomes) until they renegotiate. In a contractual equilibrium, the parties choose their individual actions rationally, jointly optimize when selecting a contract, and exercise their relative bargaining power. Our main result is that in a wide variety of settings, the optimal contract is semi-stationary, with stationary terms for all future periods but special terms for the current period. In each period the parties renegotiate to this same contract. For example, in a simple principal-agent model with a choice of costly monitoring technology, the optimal contract specifies mild monitoring for the current period but intense monitoring for future periods. Because the parties renegotiate in each new period, intense monitoring arises only off the equilibrium path after a failed renegotiation.
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Journals
- American Economic Review (118)
- Journal of Finance (75)
- Journal of Financial Economics (151)
- Review of Financial Studies (141)
Topic
- Bond (36)
- CEO (15)
- Director (7)
- Capital Structure (2)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (2)
Resource type
- Journal Article (485)