A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

• Chen, D., & Duffie, D. (2021). Market Fragmentation. American Economic Review, 111, 2247–2274.

  We model a simple market setting in which fragmentation of trade of the same asset across multiple exchanges improves allocative efficiency. Fragmentation reduces the inhibiting effect of price-impact avoidance on order submission. Although fragmentation reduces market depth on each exchange, it also isolates cross-exchange price impacts, leading to more aggressive overall order submission and better rebalancing of unwanted positions across traders. Fragmentation also has implications for the extent to which prices reveal traders' private information. While a given exchange price is less informative in more fragmented markets, all exchange prices taken together are more informative.

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• Chen, Z., Liu, Z., Serrato, J. C. S., & Xu, D. Y. (2021). Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts in China. American Economic Review, 111, 2065–2100.

  We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or "notch." Quasi-experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the cost-effectiveness of stimulating R&D, that notch-based policies are more effective than tax credits when relabeling is prevalent, and that modest spill-overs justify the program from a welfare perspective.

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• Eynde, O. V., Fetzer, T., Souza, P. C. L., & Wright, A. L. (2021). Security Transitions. American Economic Review, 111, 2275–2308.

  How do foreign powers disengage from a conflict? We study this issue by examining the recent, large-scale security transition from international troops to local forces in the ongoing civil conflict in Afghanistan. We construct a new dataset that combines information on this transition process with declassified conflict outcomes and previously unreleased quarterly survey data of residents' perceptions of local security. Our empirical design leverages the staggered roll-out of the transition, and employs a novel instrumental variables approach to estimate the impact. We find a significant, sharp, and timely decline of insurgent violence in the initial phase: the security transfer to Afghan forces. We find that this is followed by a significant surge in violence in the second phase: the actual physical withdrawal of foreign troops. We argue that this pattern is consistent with a signaling model, in which the insurgents reduce violence strategically to facilitate the foreign military withdrawal to capitalize on the reduced foreign military presence afterward. Our findings clarify the destabilizing consequences of withdrawal in one of the costliest conflicts in modern history, and yield potentially actionable insights for designing future security transitions.

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• Field, E., Moore, C. T., Pande, R., Rigol, N., & Schaner, S. (2021). On Her Own Account: How Strengthening Women’s Financial Control Impacts Labor Supply and Gender Norms. American Economic Review, 111, 2342–2375.

  Can increasing control over earnings incentivize a woman to work, and thereby influence norms around gender roles? We randomly varied whether rural Indian women received bank accounts, training in account use, and direct deposit of public sector wages into their own (versus husbands') accounts. Relative to the accounts only group, women who also received direct deposit and training worked more in public and private sector jobs. The private sector result suggests gender norms initially constrained female employment. Three years later, direct deposit and training broadly liberalized women's own work-related norms, and shifted perceptions of community norms.

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• Gross, T., Kluender, R., Liu, F., Notowidigdo, M. J., & Wang, J. (2021). The Economic Consequences of Bankruptcy Reform. American Economic Review, 111, 2309–2341.

  A more generous consumer bankruptcy system provides greater insurance against financial risks but may also raise the cost of credit. We study this trade-off using the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which increased the costs of filing for bankruptcy. We identify the effects of BAPCPA on borrowing costs using variation in the effects of the reform across credit scores. We find that a one-percentage-point reduction in bankruptcy filing risk decreased credit card interest rates by 70–90 basis points. Conversely, BAPCPA reduced the insurance value of bankruptcy, with uninsured hospitalizations 70 percent less likely to obtain bankruptcy relief after the reform.

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• Hakimov, R., Heller, C.-P., Kurino, M., & Kübler, D. (2021). How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems. American Economic Review, 111, 2127–2151.

  Allocating appointment slots is presented as a new application for market design. Online booking systems are commonly used by public authorities to allocate appointments for visa interviews, driver's licenses, passport renewals, etc. We document that black markets for appointments have developed in many parts of the world. Scalpers book the appointments that are offered for free and sell the slots to appointment seekers. We model the existing first-come-first-served booking system and propose an alternative batch system. The batch system collects applications for slots over a certain time period and then randomly allocates slots to applicants. The theory predicts and lab experiments confirm that scalpers profitably book and sell slots under the current system with sufficiently high demand, but that they are not active in the proposed batch system. We discuss practical issues for the implementation of the batch system and its applicability to other markets with scalping.

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• Leaver, C., Ozier, O., Serneels, P., & Zeitlin, A. (2021). Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools. American Economic Review, 111, 2213–2246.

  This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay for performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a "pay-for-percentile" or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

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• Zou, E. Y. (2021). Unwatched Pollution: The Effect of Intermittent Monitoring on Air Quality. American Economic Review, 111, 2101–2126.

  Intermittent monitoring of environmental standards may induce strategic changes in polluting activities. This paper documents local strategic responses to a cyclical, once-every-six-day air quality monitoring schedule under the federal Clean Air Act. Using satellite data of monitored areas, I show that air quality is significantly worse on unmonitored days. This effect is explained by short-term suppression of pollution on monitored days, especially during high-pollution periods when the city's noncompliance risk is high. Cities' use of air quality warnings increases on monitored days, which suggests local governments' role in coordinating emission reductions.

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• Abebe, G., Caria, A. S., & Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2021). The Selection of Talent: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia. American Economic Review, 111, 1757–1806.

  We study how search frictions in the labor market affect firms' ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is effective because the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker ability. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives.

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• Barseghyan, L., Molinari, F., & Thirkettle, M. (2021). Discrete Choice under Risk with Limited Consideration. American Economic Review, 111, 1972–2006.

  This paper is concerned with learning decision-makers' preferences using data on observed choices from a finite set of risky alternatives. We propose a discrete choice model with unobserved heterogeneity in consideration sets and in standard risk aversion. We obtain sufficient conditions for the model's semi-nonparametric point identification, including in cases where consideration depends on preferences and on some of the exogenous variables. Our method yields an estimator that is easy to compute and is applicable in markets with large choice sets. We illustrate its properties using a dataset on property insurance purchases.

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