This article investigates the impact of political uncertainty on contractual lending terms using a large sample of syndicated loans and a within-firm estimation approach to achieve identification. Firms pay 7 basis points (bps) more on loans originated when their lenders are undergoing an election relative to when their lenders are not undergoing an election. Lenders from less financially developed countries are more likely to pass political uncertainty costs to borrowers. Consistent with electoral uncertainty driving this premium, the most contested elections have the largest impact (17 bps). Overall, political uncertainty leads to a tangible increase in firms’ financing costs.

Using financial account data linking small businesses to their owner households, we examine how business owners’ consumption responded to changes in business revenues during the COVID-19 crisis. In the first two months following the National Emergency, business revenues declined by 40 percent, largely driven by national factors rather than local infection rates or policies. However, the pass-through of revenue losses to owner consumption was limited: each dollar of revenue loss resulted in only a 1.6-cent decline in consumption. This muted pass-through persisted through 2021, even after the introduction of COVID-19 vaccines. Our findings suggest that federal subsidies and pandemic-induced reductions in spending opportunities explain the limited impact.

The efficiency of federal lending guarantees depends on whether guarantees increase lending supply or simply act as a subsidy to lenders. We use notches in the guarantee rate schedule for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans to estimate the elasticity of bank lending volume to loan guarantees. We show significant bunching in the loan distribution on the side of the size threshold that carries a more generous loan guarantee. The excess mass implies that increasing guarantee generosity by one percentage point of loan principal would increase per-loan lending volume by $19,000. Excess mass increases in periods with guarantee generosity, and placebo results indicate that the effect disappears when the guarantee notch is eliminated.

We test the relation between ambiguity aversion and five household portfolio choice puzzles: nonparticipation in equities, low allocations to equity, home-bias, own-company stock ownership, and portfolio under-diversification. In a representative US household survey, we measure ambiguity preferences using custom-designed questions based on Ellsberg urns. As theory predicts, ambiguity aversion is negatively associated with stock market participation, the fraction of financial assets in stocks, and foreign stock ownership, but it is positively related to own-company stock ownership. Conditional on stock ownership, ambiguity aversion is related to portfolio under-diversification, and during the financial crisis, ambiguity-averse respondents were more likely to sell stocks.

We test whether probability weighting affects household portfolio choice in a representative survey. On average, people display inverse-S-shaped probability weighting, overweighting low probability events. As theory predicts, probability weighting is positively associated with portfolio underdiversification and significant Sharpe ratio losses. Analyzing respondents’ individual stock holdings, we find higher probability weighting is associated with owning lottery-type stocks and positively skewed equity portfolios. People with higher probability weighting are less likely to own mutual funds and more likely to either avoid equities or hold individual stocks. We are the first to empirically link individuals’ elicited probability weighting and real-world decisions under risk.