Knowledge that Transforms

In an investigation of possible relationships between shareholder voting turnout, trading volume after the record data, and the intervals between the record and meeting dates, we find that higher trading volume and more trading days between the record date and the receipt of proxy materials both reduce voting turnout. A longer interval between the receipt of proxy materials and the meeting increases turnout, as does greater solicitation expense. Our tests show that management mails proxies further in advance of the meeting when its proposals require a majority of shares outstanding, as opposed to votes cast, for approval.

The greater the managerial stock ownership in closed-end funds, the larger are the discounts to net asset value. The average discount for funds with blockholders is 14%, whereas the average discount for funds without blockholders is only 4%. This relation is robust over time and to various model specifications that control for other factors that affect discounts. We argue that blockholders receive private benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders and that they veto open-ending proposals to preserve these benefits. We support this argument by documenting a range of potential private benefits received by blockholders in closed-end funds.

This paper identifies five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. There are three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity. There are two bond-market factors, related to maturity and default risks. Stock returns have shared variation due to the stock-market factors, and they are linked to bond returns through shared variation in the bond-market factors. Except for low-grade corporates, the bond-market factors capture the common variation in bond returns. Most important, the five factors seem to explain average returns on stocks and bonds.

Several recent papers present signaling models in which firms underprice their initial public offerings of equity (IPOs) so that they can subsequently issue seasoned equity at more favorable prices. We test the implications of these models. We find a positive relation between IPO underpricing and the probability and size of subsequent seasoned offerings. Although these results are consistent with the implications of the signaling hypotheses, the economic significance appears weak. We conduct additional tests to evaluate other explanations for these findings and find the alternatives more compelling.

This paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt. Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. It also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information, although better-than-average borrowers desire information sensitivity. The model implies that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt, and that long-term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt. The model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults.

This paper examines irreversible investment decisions when projects take time to complete and are subject to two types of cost uncertainty. The first is technical uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the physical difficulty of completing a project, which is only resolved as the investment proceeds. The second is input cost uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the prices of construction inputs or over government regulations affecting construction costs, which is external to the firm. These two types of uncertainty have very different effects on the investment decision. A simple investment rule is derived that maximizes firm value, and is used to analyze the decision to start or continue building a nuclear power plant during the 1980s.

This paper examines the price effect of institutional stock trading, using a unique data set that reports the transactions (large and small) of 37 large institutional money management firms. The direction of each trade and the identity of the management firm behind each trade are known. Although institutional trades are associated with some price pressure, we find that the average effect is small. There is also a marked asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells. We relate our findings to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks, the cost of executing transactions, and the determinants of market impact. Although market capitalization and relative trade size influence the market impact of a trade, the dominant influence is the identity of the money manager behind the trade.

We examine the proportion of a stock's cumulative price change that occurs in each trade-size category, using transactions data for a sample of NYSE firms. Although the majority of trades are small, most of the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size trades. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category, and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders' private information.

This paper reassesses the apparent systematic underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). Investigation of the distribution of initial returns following IPOs shows that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left (negative) tail. Moreover, most IPOs with zero one-day returns subsequently fall in price, suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial IPO returns, even if offering prices are set at expected market value. This paper thus challenges the presumption underlying previous research that positive average initial IPO returns result primarily from deliberate underpricing.