Knowledge that Transforms

Empirically, the effect of corporate tax rates on leverage has been smaller than expected based on trade-off theory. In this article, I show that tax avoidance functions as a non-debt tax shield, reducing the benefits of the debt tax shield. I find that higher tax rates cause higher non-debt tax avoidance, which crowds out the debt tax shield. Moreover, I show that the strength of the relationship between debt and tax rates depends on the level of tax avoidance. A 1-standard-deviation higher tax rate implies 2.8% higher leverage for low tax avoidance firms, but has a negative effect for high tax avoidance firms.

We find that CEO compensation increases following acquisitions only in those deals in which acquirer stock is used as the method of payment. These compensation increases are driven by increases in equity-based compensation and are concentrated in riskier acquirers, in riskier acquisitions, and in acquirers whose CEOs have low exposure to the stock price. We find little support for traditional agency cost explanations of changes in CEO pay following acquisitions. However, our findings are broadly consistent with compensation changes representing a contracting solution to a two-sided adverse selection problem that is present only in stock acquisitions.

How do bankers treat green firms? Using unique loan application and banker preference data from a mid-sized bank, we find that customer managers, serving as front-line bankers, give more favorable recommendations to green firms, especially when they hold green values themselves. However, a minority of environmentally skeptical loan officers, aware through internal training that customer managers generally have greener preferences, counter this by downgrading positive evaluations of green firms. Despite not knowing the customer manager’s identity, these officers use their discretion to mitigate what they perceive as green biases, demonstrating the significant moderating role of superiors within the bank’s hierarchy.

We use a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) to show that victories by women candidates in close House, Senate, and gubernatorial elections lead to an increase in female directors in firms located in the candidates’ districts. The causal effect is higher when the media coverage of the woman candidate is higher, when voter turnout is high, and when firms have more local directors and local institutional investors. The heterogeneous regression discontinuity (RD) effects suggest that electoral wins may influence local gender norms and firms’ board diversity through multiple channels, including conveying majority views on gender-related social norms, increasing exposure to exemplar women, and facilitating learning about women’s different but effective leadership styles. The evidence suggests a potential spillover effect from women’s political leadership to the corporate world.

We model the time-varying probability of consumption disasters with international risk interactions and estimate the model using national accounts data of 42 countries back to 1833. The estimated world and country-specific disaster probabilities accord well with historical macroeconomic disasters. A match of the equity premium requires a relative risk aversion coefficient of approximately 5, which is significantly lower than previous estimates. Furthermore, the model provides notably better fits for equity volatility compared with alternative rare-disaster models. Finally, the disaster probability index estimated from the model demonstrates significant out-of-sample predictive power over long horizons, performing well not only over time but also across countries.

We develop a continuous-time model examining agency conflicts among controlling shareholders (managers), minority shareholders, and creditors in corporate investment decisions. The manager’s private benefits encourage overinvestment, while their equity stake and debt overhang lead to underinvestment. We show these offsetting incentive effects can achieve optimal investment timing under certain conditions. Agency costs exhibit U-shaped relationships with private benefits, tax rates, volatility, managerial ownership, and leverage. The model reveals how the interplay among agency conflicts, tax benefits, and bankruptcy costs shapes optimal ownership and capital structure, explaining several documented empirical patterns in corporate finance.

Exploiting changes in countries’ competition laws, we find that competition increases firms’ propensity to use zero leverage (ZL). We test the financial-flexibility, financial-constraint, and quiet-life explanations for this result, concluding that desire for flexibility is the one most likely. The relation between competition and ZL strengthens with cash-flow volatility, which supports the flexibility motive. Adoption of ZL by firms is accompanied by increases in payouts, so it is unlikely that ZL adopters are constrained. Proxies for governance have no effect on the relation between competition and ZL, suggesting that desire for a quiet life is not the explanation either.

This article shows that when a compensation peer firm experiences a significant failure in its say-on-pay (SOP) voting, the focal firm’s stock price is adversely affected, resulting in reduced CEO pay in the subsequent period. This pay-reduction effect is amplified when the board is more powerful, when proxy advisors express concerns about CEO pay, and when the compensation consultant lacks quality. Directors who react to the price drop and cut the CEO’s pay receive higher votes in future director elections, implying a market feedback effect for directors of the focal firm triggered by their peers’ SOP voting failure.

We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.

We study the information content of corporate insiders’ trades after earnings announcements. We find little evidence that insiders trade on foreknowledge of material information in the post-SOX period. Conditioning on short-selling activity as a proxy for demand of arbitrageurs who exploit short-term mispricing, we show that insiders profit from selling because of their ability to exploit short-term mispricing after earnings releases. In contrast before SOX, insiders do take advantage of foreknowledge of material information while selling. Insider purchases are based on foreknowledge of material information both before and after SOX, but they are rare and have small economic magnitude.