This paper investigates whether so-called anomalous returns predicted by accounting numbers reflect normal returns for risk or abnormal returns. It does so via a model showing how accounting numbers inform about normal returns if pricing were rational. The model equates expected returns to expectations of earnings and earnings growth, so that any variable that forecasts earnings and earnings growth also indicates the required return if the market prices those outcomes as risky. The empirical results confirm that many accounting anomaly variables (such as accruals, asset growth, and investment) forecast forward earnings and growth, and in the same direction in which they forecast returns. While the lack of an agreed-upon asset pricing model for required returns rules out definitive conclusions, the paper provides both a framework and supporting empirical results indicating that the observed “anomalous” returns associated with accounting numbers are consistent with rational pricing.

We evaluate the descriptive validity of the cost behavior model for profit analysis using Compustat data. For this purpose, we propose an earnings forecast model decomposing earnings into components that reflect (1) variability of costs with sales revenue and (2) stickiness in costs with sales declines. We evaluate the predictive ability of our model by benchmarking its performance in forecasting one-year-ahead returns on equity against that of two other time-series models based on line item information reported in the income statement and in the statement of cash flows. Specifically, we consider a model that disaggregates earnings into operating income and non-operating income components and another that disaggregates earnings into cash flows and accruals components. While all three models are less accurate than analysts' consensus forecasts that rely on a larger information set, we find that our model provides substantial improvement in forecast accuracy over the other two models that use only the line items in the financial statements. Finally, invoking the market efficiency assumption, we find that earnings forecast errors based on our model have greater relative information content than forecast errors based on the two alternative models based on financial statement information in explaining abnormal stock returns.

In this paper, we examine how CEO succession and succession planning affect perceptions of financial reporting risk among stakeholders who are responsible for and oversee firms' financial reporting (e.g., auditors, management, and audit committees). Management succession introduces uncertainty about firms' future operations, financial policies, and potential motivation for earnings management, which we predict elevates the perceived risk of financial reporting improprieties. Consistent with this prediction, we find that audit fees are higher for firms with new CEOs. Importantly, however, we note that careful CEO succession planning (i.e., promoting an “heir apparent”) attenuates perceptions of higher risk, as evidenced by a lack of an audit pricing adjustment. These results are robust to several alternative specifications and analyses designed to mitigate the concern that the association between audit fees and CEO succession and succession planning is driven by factors leading to the CEO change. We also show that audit fee increases dissipate over time as the new, non-heir CEO stays longer at the firm, reinforcing the inference that audit fees increase in response to the uncertainty surrounding a new CEO. Additionally, we do not find evidence of a deterioration in audit quality with new CEOs, independent of the succession plan.

We examine the impact of the SEC’s Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI) on the role of employee gender in the Division of Corporation Finance’s filing review process. Gender bias theory suggests that women may work harder to compensate for perceived bias and discrimination. Consistent with this theory, we find that women reviewers issue longer comment letters, raise more issues, ask more accounting-specific questions, reference more authoritative guidance, request more filing amendments, follow up on more issues from prior rounds, and take longer to close the comment letter process. We also find that women are less prevalent in higher paygrades and leadership positions. These gender differences attenuate after the establishment of OMWI in 2011, but significant differences remain. Analyses of SEC employee survey data corroborate our comment letter results. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

Whether audit firms should disclose financial statements is controversial among investors, practitioners, and regulators. The debate centers on whether audit firms’ financial statements provide information about audit quality. Using hand-collected data from U.K. audit firms’ financial statements, we construct four measures that capture audit firms’ resource investments (i.e., human capital, workplace environment, technologies) and risk exposures (i.e., litigation provisions). We find that increases in audit firms’ staff costs, investments in tangible assets and IT software, and reductions in litigation provisions are associated with improved audit quality. The information in audit firms’ financial statements is not contained in their transparency reports or regulatory inspection reports. Additional tests show that increases in audit firms’ staff costs and tangible assets, as well as reductions in litigation provisions, are associated with improved audit efficiency.

Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing.

This study examines the association between a shared common auditor among suppliers and customers and trade credit. Using hand-collected pairwise trade credit data, we find that a supplier extends more trade credit to a customer audited by a common auditor. This association is robust to alternative design specifications and various sample restrictions to alleviate selection bias. We then interview trade credit managers and executives as a prelude to archival analyses exploring multiple potential mechanisms to explain this association. The collective results are most consistent with the explanation that mutual third parties to a dyadic relationship can foster trust through social connections and increased salience of reputation effects rather than that a common auditor reduces information asymmetry about the rigor of the audit process. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.