Knowledge that Transforms

This essay examines interconnections between "race" and economic inequality in the United States, focusing on the case of African-Americans. I will argue that it is crucially important to distinguish between racial discrimination and racial stigma in the study of this problem. Racial discrimination has to do with how blacks are treated, while racial stigma is concerned with how black people are perceived. My view is that what I call reward bias (unfair treatment of persons in formal economic transactions based on racial identity) is now a less significant barrier to the full participation by African-Americans in U.S. society than is what I will call development bias (blocked access to resources critical for personal development but available only via non-market-mediated social transactions). By making these points in the specific cultural and historical context of the black experience in U.S. society, I hope to contribute to a deeper conceptualization of the worldwide problem of race and economic marginality.

Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated and analytically skilled (Camerer, 2003). The challenge is to create models that are as general, precise, and parsimonious as equilibrium, but which also use cognitive details to explain experimental evidence more accurately and to predict new regularities. This paper describes three exemplar models of behavior in one-shot games (thinking), learning over time, and how repeated “partner” matching affects behavior (teaching) (see Camerer et al., 2002b).

In 1914, an accounting professor named Arthur Andersen founded a public accounting practice that became the world’s largest professional-services firm. For years preceding the Enron debacle and Andersen’s collapse, the firm had struggled to create incentives within the organization for partners to provide high-quality service, develop and sell new services, and meet the compensation expectations of various factions of partners. A years-long dispute over the division of profits between the firm’s consulting and accounting arms led to the 1998 separation of the consulting practice from the audit and tax practices. The rise, break-up and fall of Andersen underlines the importance of questions concerning incentive structures within public accounting firms in particular, and partnerships of professionals in general. This paper offers a perspective on partner compensation schemes and the accounting information systems that support them.

A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.

This paper studies the evolution of sectoral concentration in relation to the level of per capita income. We show that various measures of sectoral concentration follow a U-shaped pattern across a wide variety of data sources: countries first diversify, in the sense that economic activity is spread more equally across sectors, but there exists, relatively late in the development process, a point at which they start specializing again. We discuss this finding in light of existing theories of trade and growth, which generally predict a monotonic relationship between income and diversification.

Expert Opinion and Compensation: Evidence from a Musical Competition by Victor A. Ginsburgh and Jan C. van Ours. Published in volume 93, issue 1, pages 289-296 of American Economic Review, March 2003

This paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods (FIGs), such as education and the environment, when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism. We show that backward intergenerational goods (BIGs), such as social security, play a crucial role in sustaining investment in FIGs: without them investment is inefficiently low, but with them optimal investment is possible. We also show that making the provision of BIGs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of FIGs, and that population aging can increase investment in FIGs.

Charitable Bequests and Taxes on Inheritances and Estates: Aggregate Evidence from across States and Time by Jon M. Bakija, William G. Gale and Joel B. Slemrod. Published in volume 93, issue 2, pages 366-370 of American Economic Review, May 2003

Banning affirmative action from college admissions cannot prevent an admissions office that cares about diversity from achieving it in ways other than explicitly considering race. We model college admissions where candidates from two groups with different average qualiÞcations compete for a Þxed number of seats. Under affirmative action, an admissions office that cares both about quality and diversity admits the best-qualiÞed candidates from each group. Under a ban, it may promote diversity by partially ignoring candidates’ qualiÞcations and therefore not admitting the best-qualiÞed candidates from either group. A ban always reduces diversity and may also lower quality. (JEL J71 ,J 15, I28)