Knowledge that Transforms

Measuring the geographic spillovers from an economic shock remains a challenging econometric problem. In Feyrer, Mansur, and Sacerdote (2017) we study the propagation of positive shocks from the recent boom in oil and gas production in the United States. We regress changes in income per capita on new energy production per capita within increasingly larger geographic circles. James and Smith (2020) proposes instead a single regression of county income per capita on energy production from successively larger donuts around the county. This method controls for production outside of the circle of interest and is likely the appropriate estimation method for estimating the impact of within-county production. Their results suggest that FMS overestimates the impact of new production. We show that we can incorporate similar controls using our basic estimation method and that (unlike James and Smith) these controls do not significantly change our results. To explore these differences, we perform simulation exercises which show that the James-Smith estimation method is biased downward with the heterogeneous population distributions across counties that we observe in the data.

We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior, potentially attributable to information-gathering costs, lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained. Middle-aged and wealthy households act as if they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less-educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings. We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission.

Publicizing firms’ socially undesirable actions may enhance firms’ incentives to avoid such actions. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began issuing press releases about facilities that violated safety and health regulations. Using quasi-random variation arising from a cutoff rule OSHA followed, I find that publicizing a facility’s violations led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance and experience fewer occupational injuries. OSHA would need to conduct 210 additional inspections to achieve the same improvement in compliance as achieved with a single press release. Evidence suggests that employers improve compliance to avoid costly responses from workers.

We investigate wealth returns on an administrative panel containing the disaggregated balance sheets of Swedish residents. The expected return on household net wealth is strongly persistent, determined primarily by systematic risk, and increasing in net worth, exceeding the risk-free rate by the size of the equity premium for households in the top 0.01 percent. Idiosyncratic risk is transitory but generates substantial long-term dispersion in returns in top brackets. Systematic and idiosyncratic risk both drive the cross-sectional distribution of the geometric average return over a generation. Furthermore, wealth returns explain most of the historical increase in top wealth shares.

I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms’ actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms’ payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe.

Worsening environmental conditions threaten to undermine progress in reducing rural poverty. Little is known, however, about the prospects for farmer adaptations to mitigate this threat, in particular through opportunities for income diversification presented by recent non-agricultural growth. We study the effects of increasing water scarcity in India using quasi-random, geologically determined differences in access to groundwater. The drying up of wells results in a precipitous and persistent decline in farm income and wealth, with little evidence of agricultural adaptation. However, labor reallocation to off-farm employment appears successful in maintaining overall income, particularly in locations with a more developed manufacturing sector.

We establish that creditor beliefs regarding future borrowing can be self-fulfilling, leading to multiple equilibria with markedly different debt accumulation patterns. We characterize such indeterminacy in the Eaton-Gersovitz sovereign debt model augmented with long maturity bonds. Two necessary conditions for the multiplicity are (i) the government is more impatient than foreign creditors, and (ii) there are deadweight losses from default. The multiplicity is dynamic and stems from the self-fulfilling beliefs of how future creditors will price bonds; long maturity bonds are therefore a crucial component of the multiplicity. We introduce a third party with deep pockets to discuss the policy implications of this source of multiplicity and identify the potentially perverse consequences of traditional “lender of last resort” policies.

Matsumoto (2020) pointed out data and coding errors in Fang and Gong (2017). We show that these errors have limited impacts: all qualitative findings remain after correcting them. Matsumoto also discussed potential service overcounting in the aggregated utilization data we used to illustrate our method, and then quantified the extent of overcounting with a sample of Medicare claims. We acknowledge the issue but discuss the noise and the bias in his quantification. Overall, our proposed method remains useful, as regulators who are interested in applying the method are unlikely to be subject to the data limitations.

We study the impact of vertical integration on pricing incentives in multiproduct industries. To do so, we exploit recent variation in vertical structure in the US carbonated-beverage industry. While the elimination of double marginalization with vertical integration is normally characterized as procompetitive, economic theory predicts that it may cause anticompetitive price increases in multiproduct industries. We indeed find that vertical integration causes price decreases in products with eliminated double margins but price increases in the other products sold by the integrated firm. These results provide new evidence of anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers.

We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. A long-term contract governs the stage games that the contracting parties will play in the future (depending on verifiable stage-game outcomes) until they renegotiate. In a contractual equilibrium, the parties choose their individual actions rationally, jointly optimize when selecting a contract, and exercise their relative bargaining power. Our main result is that in a wide variety of settings, the optimal contract is semi-stationary, with stationary terms for all future periods but special terms for the current period. In each period the parties renegotiate to this same contract. For example, in a simple principal-agent model with a choice of costly monitoring technology, the optimal contract specifies mild monitoring for the current period but intense monitoring for future periods. Because the parties renegotiate in each new period, intense monitoring arises only off the equilibrium path after a failed renegotiation.