We investigate the role of financial analysts in product quality failures. Relying on information about product recalls, we first show that analyst coverage on average reduces product quality, particularly when managers face greater short-term pressure from institutional investors. However, after identifying a subgroup of analysts who raise questions on product-related issues in earnings conference calls, we find that coverage by these “product analysts” enhances rather than compromises product quality. Firms with greater product analyst coverage are also more likely to retire low-quality products. Additional analysis demonstrates that product analysts help safeguard product quality by further probing into product-related matters and issuing more timely recommendation downgrades after firms announce product deficiencies. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

In China's political selection system, officials capable of growing local economies are rewarded with promotions. Eager to demonstrate economic achievements, newly appointed local leaders may raise tax revenues to expand fiscal expenditures on infrastructure projects. Against this backdrop, we study how political appointments influence local firms' tax planning. Based on a sample of locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that firms decrease their tax avoidance after new leaders take office. The political-turnover effect on these firms' tax positions is more evident when the incoming leaders have more political clout over SOE managers, the incentives to divert resources are stronger, or politician-manager networks are present, and subsides following the launch of the anticorruption campaign. Furthermore, firms with higher post-turnover tax payments subsequently receive more government contracts or subsidies. Overall, our findings suggest political incentives shape the tax-planning activities of SOE managers in a “two-way favor exchange” manner.

This paper utilizes receipt lotteries in Taiwan, along with comprehensive administrative data, to examine the effect of cash windfalls on stock market participation and portfolio diversification, which can help us understand whether wealth levels serve as the explanation for the limited participation and under-diversification puzzles in stock markets. The results indicate that each million TWD (approximately 33,000 USD) windfall gain from winning receipt lotteries increases the probability of stock market participation by 1.09 percentage points. This effect is primarily driven by individuals who were not participating in the stock market prior to winning. For existing participants, each million TWD windfall increases the total value of stocks by 142,552 TWD, attributed to both an increase in their number of shares and higher average prices of the stocks they hold. Additionally, we find that individuals do not significantly diversify their portfolios after winning the lottery, suggesting that wealth level is not the primary reason for under-diversification.

Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are stressed. This elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt‐overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to a credit‐sensitive reference rate like the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). We show that transition to risk‐free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit supply is offset if drawdowns are expected to be deposited at the same bank, which happened at some of the largest banks during the global financial crisis and COVID recession.

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.

We study whether sell-side financial analysts’ social ties to firm management help them discern firms’ financial reporting frauds and, upon such detection, how the connected analysts disseminate the information. Using unique data from China, we find that, although unconnected analysts do not manifest a significant change in their likelihood of covering the fraud firms nor in issuing more downgrade stock ratings, connected analysts are significantly more likely to drop coverage right after these firms’ first annual reports containing fraudulent information. Meanwhile, mutual funds with a trading commission relationship to these connected analysts (i.e., client funds) are significantly more likely to unload their holdings of fraud firms than nonclient funds after these firms’ first fraudulent annual reports. Overall, the evidence suggests that analysts with social ties to firm management have early access to bad news and choose to privately communicate the negative information to their clients. Data Availability: All data used in this article are publicly available.

We use proprietary data on intraday transactions at a futures brokerage to analyze how implied leverage influences trading performance. Across all investors, leverage is negatively related to performance, due partly to increased trading costs and partly to forced liquidations resulting from margin calls. Defining skill out‐of‐sample, we find that relative performance differentials across unskilled and skilled investors persist. Unskilled investors' leverage amplifies losses from lottery preferences and the disposition effect. Leverage stimulates liquidity provision by skilled investors, and enhances returns. Although regulatory increases in required margins decrease skilled investors' returns, they enhance overall returns, and attenuate return volatility.

This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter‐end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information‐sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings exhibit superior performance up to 12 months, and tend to take longer to build. Together the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality.

Systemic risk must include the housing market, though economists have not generally focused on it. We begin construction of an agent-based model of the housing market with individual data from Washington, DC. Twenty years of success with agent-based models of mortgage prepayments give us hope that such a model could be useful. Preliminary analysis suggests that the housing boom and bust of 1997-2007 was due in large part to changes in leverage rather than interest rates.

We develop a continuous-time asset allocation model to investigate the effects of mean-reverting stock returns on investors with Prospect Theory (PT) preferences. Our semi-analytical solution facilitates a comprehensive exploration of how the stock investment of PT investors may differ when accounting for mean reversion. We find that incorporating mean reversion attenuates the distinct V-shaped demand pattern in relation to contemporaneous prices, which is more pronounced when mean reversion is absent, by significantly reducing PT investors’ stock demand following price increases. This shift leads to a stock demand profile that demonstrates an inverse relationship with stock prices. In line with this change, we also show that combining PT utility with mean reversion predicts short-term contrarian behavior and the disposition effect more reliably than benchmark models that incorporate either PT utility or mean-reverting returns alone.