We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from devoting effort to further manipulation of the accounting system, which reduces the cost of motivating the employees to devote their effort to improving the real (rather than the measured) performance of the organization.

We examine the design of asset revaluation policies in settings where a regulator can mandate fair value disclosure in order to mitigate a lemons problem in the asset resale market. The welfare-maximizing policy generally prescribes fair value certification for the lower asset values and (less costly) historical cost reporting for the higher asset values. The potential for voluntary certification can reduce welfare by increasing equilibrium certification costs and promoting underinvestment in socially valuable projects. Thus, a single regulated source of information (mandated disclosure) can be preferable to two sources of information (mandated and voluntary disclosure).