This paper considers the effect of precommitment in contests where the rivals expend effort to win a prize. With two asymmetric players, it is found that the favorite will commit effort at a higher level than that in a Nash equilibrium without commitment, and the underdog at a lower level. With many players, the absence of an odds-on favorite among rivals is sufficient to ensure overcommitment by any one player. Applications to sports, oligopoly, and rent and rent seeking are discussed.

A model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed. In the absence of restrictions, investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long-run average cost by an option value factor. When a lower ceiling is imposed, investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher "shadow" price. As the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long-run average cost, this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely. Because investment is depressed, a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long-run average price.

A firm's entry and exit decisions when the output price follows a random walk are examined. An idle firm and an active firm are viewed as assets that are call options on each other. The solution is a pair of trigger prices for entry and exit. The entry trigger exceeds the variable cost plus the interest on the entry cost, and the exit trigger is less than the variable cost minus the interest on the exit cost. These gaps produce "hysteresis." Numerical solutions are obtained for several parameter values; hysteresis is found to be significant even with small sunk costs.

This article reviews Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s book The Narrow Corridor. They depict a constant tussle between “society,” which wants liberty but cannot sustain order, and “state,” which maintains order but grows oppressive. I argue that the book has a huge theme and an impressive historical sweep of supportive examples, but leaves many open questions. The two conceptual categories should be unpacked to examine complex interactions within and across them, and other examples that counter the authors’ thesis should be reckoned with. However, the authors deserve congratulations for a brilliantly written and thought-provoking book that will inspire much future research.

This essay reviews Lawrence Freedman's book Strategy: A History. The main themes—definitions, strategies in war, business, politics, and revolutions—are overviewed. The value of game-theoretic thinking for practical strategy is assessed. A critical discussion of some concepts and dichotomies emphasized by Freedman, e.g., strategy is governed by the starting point, not the end point, and of the role of stories and scripts in strategy, follows.

Decisions made under ongoing uncertainty and costly reversibility entail a range of the state variable where inaction is optimal, which in turn produces hysteresis--permanent effects of temporary shifts. The range is usually defined by nonlinear equations that need numerical solutions. In this paper, a technique of analytical approximations is developed and applied to two models--menu costs and investment. The resulting explicit solutions help clarify why hysteresis is important even for small irreversibility. In the menu cost model, hysteresis is two orders of magnitude larger than under the Akerlof-Yellen or Mankiw assumptions.

This paper considers a small open economy with a safe sector and a risky sector. The probability of success in the risky activity differs across individuals, and is private information. It is shown that policies that sustain informationally constrained Pareto optima should not include tariffs. A laissez-faire competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is Pareto optimal. These results contrast with previous literature on the role of tariffs as insurance, where private risk markets are assumed away in an ad hoc manner.