This paper uses a principal-agent model to study the interaction between hedging and earnings management. Hedging makes earnings management more difficult and they appear to be strategic substitutes in this model, which is both consistent with existing empirical evidence and provides a new explanation for that evidence. If hedging decision is contractible, hedging is efficient since it reduces both the risk premium and the equilibrium amount of earnings management. If hedging decision is not contractible, however, hedging does not always alleviate the agency problem. Surprisingly, sometimes a scenario of no hedging but allowing earnings management is efficient. The reason is that motivating hedging may require a more costly compensation scheme to mitigate the appeal of earnings management. In addition, this paper shows that tolerating some earnings management is always efficient when there is no hedge option, since it is costly to eliminate earnings management. Sometimes it is inefficient to take any action against earnings management. However, with the encouraged hedge option, the cost to eliminate earnings management can be reduced significantly and zero tolerance of earnings management may be efficient.

We examine a duopolistic setting in which firms can preannounce their future competitive decisions before they actually implement them. We show that there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms preannounce and overstate their future actions when uncertainty of demand is low. We find that firms choose higher real actions than the ones they would choose in the absence of preannouncements. Moreover, the real actions of both firms are single-peaked functions of their credibility. In a Cournot market, firms face a prisoner's dilemma in which preannouncing lowers firms' profits. If firms could commit not to preannounce, they would remain silent. In a Bertrand market, firms overstate their future actions to foster collusion.

ABSTRACT We examine information quality and financial leverage when an entrepreneur needs financing to undertake a risky project and his effort input affects the project's outcome. We show that information quality and financial leverage interact to play active roles in both investment and effort decisions. Our analysis shows a positive association between leverage and optimal information quality—when leverage is low (high), low (high) information quality is optimal. This is because with low leverage, the entrepreneur is already motivated by his large share of the outcome to exert effort, and high information quality is not efficient as a precise bad signal discourages the entrepreneur's effort. In contrast, when leverage is high and thus the entrepreneur is less motivated by his residual cash flows, high information quality is optimal, because a precise good signal encourages the entrepreneur's effort. Our study highlights the joint effect of information quality and financial leverage on overall efficiency through firms' effort inputs as well as on defining investment efficiency.

ABSTRACT We investigate how incentives provided by whistleblowing programs affect the likelihood of whistleblowing, firm value, and social welfare in the presence of endogenous internal communication. Specifically, we focus on a myopic manager’s ex post decision on internal communication with the employee. An informed employee plays a dual role: working to fix the defect internally or acting as a whistleblower to expose the misconduct if the manager withholds defect information from the public. We find that, when the whistleblowing reward is relatively small, providing stronger incentives increases the likelihood of whistleblowing and can help improve firm value and social welfare. However, once rewards become excessively large and compromise internal communication, contrary to conventional wisdom, the likelihood of whistleblowing declines and both firm value and social welfare decline too. We also characterize the optimal whistleblowing rewards designed by strategic regulators seeking to maximize firm value or social welfare. JEL Classifications: D83; G30; G34; M40.

We examine the impact of increasing whistleblowing bounties on whistleblowers' strategy and regulatory efficiency in detecting fraud. Our analysis shows the regulator extracts information about the incidence of fraud from whistleblowers' actions, and the quality of such information depends on the size of whistleblowing bounties. With a larger bounty, upon receiving a whistleblowing report, the quality of the regulator's information about fraud deteriorates, whereas upon observing no whistleblowing, the information quality about no fraud improves. Although the informational improvement upon no whistleblowing has not been widely discussed, we demonstrate it is a key determinant of the optimal whistleblowing program. We show, considering the informational value of whistleblowing and no whistleblowing, the regulator should set the bounty to encourage more whistleblowing when the prior belief of fraud is stronger and the insider is better informed. Our analysis generates policy and empirical implications for designing and studying whistleblowing programs.

ABSTRACT In this study, we show that when a firm needs external financing, information quality has real effects via financing contracts on the firm's input to influence its operational outcome. Interestingly, we find that higher information quality decreases overall efficiency. Our analysis highlights the importance of considering the role of information quality in the presence of the firm's input decision upon financing contracts. In particular, information quality has a feedforward effect on the firm's real input decision via financing contracts, which in turn has a feedback effect on financing contracts and overall efficiency.

ABSTRACT We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.

Abstract In this paper, we investigate the real effects of information transparency in crowdfunding markets. Our analysis shows that the crowdfunding market features an under‐implementation inefficiency, driven by two types of uncertainty that consumers face: fundamental uncertainty about the entrepreneur's implementation cost, and strategic uncertainty due to potential coordination failures among consumers. We find that when both fundamental and strategic uncertainties are present, eliminating the fundamental uncertainty alone by revealing the implementation cost does not necessarily improve efficiency. Surprisingly, from an ex ante perspective, greater transparency makes the coordination among crowdfunding consumers less efficient, which makes the under‐implementation problem even worse and thus impairs efficiency. Our findings send a message of caution against promoting greater transparency in the crowdfunding market.

ABSTRACT This paper examines banks' choice between fair-value and historical-cost accounting when reported accounting information is used in capital requirement regulation. We center our analysis on a key difference between fair-value and historical-cost accounting: the frequency with which asset value changes are reported. We show that the elasticity of banks' loan returns to aggregate lending is a critical determinant of the interaction between capital adequacy requirements and accounting choices. If lending returns are inelastic, then higher capital requirements reduce fair-value usage. By contrast, higher capital requirements encourage fair value if capital requirements are low and lending returns are sufficiently elastic. In equilibrium, banks may elect different accounting choices, and we find that mandating uniform adoption of historical cost (fair value) is desirable when capital requirements are loose (tight). Our study offers many other implications about fundamental links between accounting and prudential choices.