The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power on performance during the period 2005–2011. We find Shari’ah supervision boards positively impact on Islamic banks’ performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (board size and board independence) and CEO power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision boards but also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective.

The view that the independent directors of large banks should contribute to safeguarding the interests of bank creditors and taxpayers, by exercising a stringent risk oversight of bank executives, has gained ground in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 crisis. Using a cross-country sample of large banks for the period 2004–2014, we show that post 2009 an increase in board independence leads to more prudent bank risk-taking compared to the rest of the sample period. This effect materializes via independent boards favoring increases in bank capitalization and decreases in bank portfolio risk after the global crisis. Additional analyses demonstrate, however, that these results do not hold for all large banks in our sample but are confined to the group of banks benefiting from a government bailout during the crisis. In most large international banks board independence does not contribute to safeguarding the interests of bank creditors and taxpayers by constraining bank risk-taking.

The extant literature suggests that complex firms can benefit from independent non-executive director (INED) quality. To address the issue of INED quality, we look at heterogeneity in the independent non-executive directors' (INEDs') attributes and explore whether this is related to risk-taking behaviour in large banks. We gather novel, hand-collected, director-level data for approximately 2400 independent non-executive directors (INEDs) of 185 global large banks from 35 countries for the period of 2004–2016, concluding that heterogeneity in INEDs' gender, financial expertise, and board tenure all influence risk-taking behaviour. Employing several identification strategies, we show that the cause seems to be heterogeneity in the INEDs' attributes, as channelled through information asymmetry. We also find that heterogeneity in the INEDs' attributes significantly mitigates bank risk-taking in the post-2009 period. Our study contributes to the literature on both the benefits of INEDs and director heterogeneity.

In a cross-country setting we show the probability of a forced CEO turnover in large banks is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. This finding is strengthened the greater the competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of distress. Overall, the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on the quality of the choices made by CEOs. In contrast, systematic tail risk becomes important for forced CEO turnovers only in the presence of a major variation in the costs this risk generates for shareholders and the organization.

In this paper, we use the DCC MIDAS approach to assess the validity of the wake-up call hypothesis for developed and emerging markets during the global financial crisis (GFC). We use this approach to decompose the total correlations into short- (daily) and long-run (quarterly) correlations for the period from 1999 to 2011. We then examine the transmission mechanisms by regressing the quarterly economic, financial, and behavioral variables on the quarterly DCC–MIDAS correlations. We find that country specific factors are crisis contingent transmission mechanisms for the co-movements of emerging country pairs and mixed pairs of advanced and emerging countries during the global financial crisis. However, we do not observe wake-up calls in the transmission of the crisis among advanced country pairs. The classification of the transmission mechanisms for crisis and non-crisis periods with the different country pairs has important implications for crisis management as well as for portfolio investment strategies. Thus, our findings contribute to the discussion on the role and effectiveness of the international financial architecture.

This study provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between firm-level political risk and distance-to-default. Based on our examination of a quarterly dataset of 2727 U.S. firms covering a period from January 2002 to April 2019, we conclude that firm-level political risk is negatively associated with distance-to-default. We document three economic mechanisms through which political risk increases default risk: information asymmetry, organizational capital, and investment growth. The evidence indicates that the association is more pronounced for firms with low analysts’ forecast accuracy, organizational capital, and investment growth. Employing hand-collected data, we also reveal that firms are able to exploit their corporate lobbying to immunize themselves against default risk. Our findings are robust to different endogeneity identifications, including a natural experiment, alternative distance-to-default proxies, and different sub-samples. Overall, we present novel evidence of an adverse impact of firm-level political risk on distance-to-default and how such a negative effect can be mitigated.

This research examines the relationship between co-opted boards and firms' anti-takeover provisions (ATPs). Analyzing 5585 US firm-year observations for the period 2012–2022, we document a positive relationship between co-opted boards and ATPs. We further illustrate that the positive relationship is stronger in firms that exhibit subpar performance and compensate senior executives and directors more than the industry average. Furthermore, our research finds that good governance, board and executive gender diversity, gender equality, and board cultural diversity moderate the positive relationship between co-opted boards and ATPs. Our results remain robust across a battery of tests. The findings of this research have important implications for corporate boards and managers. The study contributes to the mainstream agency theory by demonstrating that co-opted boards exacerbate firms' agency problems by blocking the potential of external disciplinary mechanisms.

We examine the influence of both organizational and geographical religiosity, as important ethical parameters moderating a bank’s decision to securitize their assets. The study employs a unique database of banks located within countries marked by high (low) religious adherence. Our results provide evidence that different measures of religiosity affect a bank’s decision to securitize their assets: Banks located in countries with high religious adherence are less likely to engage with securitization compared to banks in countries with lower religiosity, while Islamic banks have a higher likelihood of embarking on a highly monitored model of asset securitization in contrast to conventional banks. When examining the motives underlying a bank’s decision to securitize assets, there is strong evidence that Islamic banks securitize their assets to improve their portfolio diversification, financial performance, and regulatory compliance. This study highlights the importance of considering informal ethical mechanisms, such as religiosity, at both the country and firm levels, when studying bank risk-taking and trading decisions, especially in countries with dual banking systems.

This study examines the role of independent directors’ network centrality in bank risk-taking. Following the shareholder-incentive hypothesis and social-network theory, we predict and find that independent directors’ connectedness is positively associated with bank risk-taking. The results hold after a battery of robustness checks and endogeneity tests. Furthermore, consistent with the influence channel of networks, we show that connectedness empowers independent directors, whereas influential independent directors facilitate aggressive investment. We also find that the risk-taking effects are more pronounced for complex banks and banks with higher equity capital, higher income diversity, and lower cost-efficiency.