Data is nonrival: a person’s location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data broadly.

Using country-level data, we study the relation between institutionalization of capital and various measures of reliance on public equity markets. For developed and developing countries, assets under institutional management (mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies) are negatively related to the number of listed companies, market capitalization, and trading volume. The negative relationships are estimated on the margin, as other factors such as GDP have countervailing positive partial effects and are generally stronger for more highly developed countries. Results indicate that as direct ownership of equity by retail investors is displaced by investing through institutions, financial systems become less public-market-centric.

This study considers the role of accounting in moments of resistance in day-to-day institutional contexts. It does so by drawing on the perspectives of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981 , 1984 , 1986) – a Russian philosopher who sought to understand the notion of dialogue in everyday communicative practices. We study these moments of resistance within the context of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – organizations affected by authoritative discourses of accountability that seek representative, tangible and verifiable understandings of impact and performance. Within our empirical study, we show how accounting reports related to performance and impact gradually moved along a continuum from being received in authoritative mode to internally persuasive mode and how, as a result, resistance to an authoritative discourse of accountability was created and maintained. We found that this was enabled through the reception and promotion of accounting’s subjunctive possibilities.

We study whether the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies depending on the characteristics of the executives subject to these mechanisms, namely their “psychological type,” as proxied by their history of legal infractions. In particular, we examine insider trading, where we can compare the trading behavior of different types of executives in the same firm. We find that “recordholder” executives, that is, those with prior legal infractions, earn significantly higher profits from purchases and sales than nonrecordholder executives. Furthermore, the profitability of both purchases and sales is significantly increasing in the severity of the infraction. Governance mechanisms, such as blackout policies, lower profits of executives with only traffic infractions; however, profits for executives with serious infractions appear insensitive to blackout policies. Insiders with serious infractions are also more likely to trade during blackout periods and before large information events and are more likely to report their trades to the SEC after the filing deadline. Collectively, our evidence suggests that while governance mechanisms can discipline executives with minor offenses, they appear largely ineffective for those with more serious infractions.

Using NYSE short-sale order data, we investigate whether short sellers’ informational advantage is related to firm earnings and analyst-related events. With a novel decomposition method, we find that while these fundamental event days constitute only 12% of sample days, they account for over 24% of the overall underperformance of heavily shorted stocks. Importantly, short sellers use both public news and private information to anticipate news regarding earnings and analysts. Shorting’s predictive ability remains significant after controlling for information in analyst actions and displays no reversal patterns, indicating that short sellers know more than analysts, and the nature of their information is long term.

What mental models do individuals use to approximate their tax schedule? Using incentivized forecasts of the U.S. Federal income tax schedule, we estimate the prevalence of the “schmeduling” heuristics for constructing mental representations of nonlinear incentive schemes. We find evidence of widespread reliance on the “ironing” heuristic, which linearizes the tax schedule using one’s average tax rate. In our preferred specification, 43% of the population irons. We find no evidence of reliance on the “spotlighting” heuristic, which linearizes the tax schedule using one’s marginal tax rate. We show that the presence of ironing rationalizes a number of empirical patterns in individuals’ perceptions of tax liability across the income distribution. Furthermore, while our empirical framework accommodates a rich class of other misperceptions, we find that a simple model including only ironers and correct forecasters accurately predicts average underestimation of marginal tax rates. We replicate our finding of prevalent ironing, and a lack of other systematic misperceptions, in a controlled experiment that studies real-stakes decisions across exogenously varied tax schedules. To illustrate the policy relevance of the ironing heuristic, we show that it augments the benefits of progressive taxation in a standard model of earnings choice. We quantify these benefits in a calibrated model of the U.S. tax system.

Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), we study the value added by (as distinct from the abnormal returns to) analysts’ recommendations. Recommending brokers’ clients trade profitably around positive recommendations at the expense of other brokers’ clients. Significant profits come from transactions before recommendation dates. Value added is greatest for upgrades to large caps, and largely insignificant for downgrades and recommendations of small caps, despite high abnormal returns. Brokers making profitable recommendations generate abnormally high commission income, recouping much of their clients’ abnormal profits, and their abnormal commission income varies in line with the abnormal profits for their clients.

Using a rich panel of owner-operated New York dairy farms, we provide new evidence on entrepreneurial behavior. We formulate a dynamic model of farms facing uninsured risks and financial constraints. Farmers derive nonpecuniary benefits from operating their businesses. We estimate the model via simulated minimum distance, matching both production and financial data. We find that financial factors and nonpecuniary benefits are of first-order importance. Collateral constraints and liquidity restrictions inhibit borrowing and the accumulation of capital, especially among high-productivity firms seeking to expand. The nonpecuniary benefits to farming are large and keep small, low-productivity farms in business. Although farmers are risk averse, eliminating uninsured production risk has only modest effects on capital and output.

The total effects of a regulatory change consist of direct effects and indirect effects (spillovers), but the standard difference-in-difference approach mostly ignores potential indirect effects. During the 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule, short-sellers become much more aggressive across the board, even in control stocks where the uptick rule is already suspended. This finding is consistent with positive and significant indirect effects on control stocks, likely driven by aggressive broad list-based shorting. In contract, the indirect effect coefficients on shorting aggressiveness are negative for the 2005 partial uptick repeal, possibly due to substitutions between control and treatment stocks.

We examine the macroeconomic effects of forward guidance shocks at the zero lower bound. Empirically, we identify forward guidance shocks using unexpected changes in futures contracts around monetary policy announcements. We then embed these policy shocks in a vector autoregression to trace out their macroeconomic implications. Forward guidance shocks that lower expected future policy rates lead to moderate increases in economic activity and inflation. After examining forward guidance shocks in the data, we show that a standard model of nominal price rigidity can reproduce our empirical findings. To estimate our theoretical model, we generate a model-implied futures curve that closely links our model with the data. Our results suggest no disconnect between the empirical effects of forward guidance shocks around policy announcements and the predictions from a standard theoretical model.