Deviations from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. Using the difference in implied volatility between pairs of call and put options to measure these deviations, we find that stocks with relatively expensive calls outperform stocks with relatively expensive puts by 50 basis points per week. We find both positive abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive calls and negative abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive puts, which cannot be explained by short sale constraints. Rebate rates from the stock lending market directly confirm that our findings are not driven by stocks that are hard to borrow. The degree of predictability is larger when option liquidity is high and stock liquidity low, while there is little predictability when the opposite is true. Controlling for size, option prices are more likely to deviate from strict put-call parity when underlying stocks face more information risk. The degree of predictability decreases over the sample period. Our results are consistent with mispricing during the earlier years of the study, with a gradual reduction of the mispricing over time.

We introduce a new approach to estimating long-term aggregate discount rates using the cross section of earnings and book values to explain current stock prices and extract expected market returns. The proposed discount rate measure is countercyclical. Shocks to it account for nearly half of historical market return variation; in contrast, shocks to other discount rate measures account for no more than 2%. It dominates other measures in explaining time-series variation in returns on duration-sorted portfolios and delivers out-of-sample predictability that exceeds that afforded by other expected return measures and predictive variables. It also performs well in international equity markets.

We use a unique database on ownership stakes of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors’ incentive structure is related to fund performance. Ownership of both independent and nonindependent directors plays an economically and statistically significant role. Funds in which directors have low ownership, or “skin in the game,” significantly underperform. We posit two economic mechanisms to explain this relation. First, lack of ownership could indicate a director’s lack of alignment with fund shareholder interests. Second, directors may have superior private information on future performance. We find evidence in support of the first and against the second mechanism.