Knowledge that Transforms

Collusion may benefit an organization if the employees, by sharing effort, information, or risk, can enhance production or lower costs. Collusion is detrimental if it leads to less effort or to withholding of information. A contract that utilizes the agents' cooperative behavior dictates less relative performance evaluation than does a noncooperative contract or a contract that ensures the employees do not cooperate. Delegation of decision authority is beneficial for a broader range of organizations if employees collude than if they do not. The constructed contracts are incentive compatible for coalitions as well as for individuals.

The development of both brand name reputation and industry specialization by Big 8 auditors is argued to be costly and therefore to increase audit fees. For a sample of 1484 Australian publicly listed companies we estimate audit fee premia for Big 8 auditors. On average, industry specialist Big 8 auditors earn a 34% premium over nonspecialist Big 8 auditors, and the Big 8 brand name premium over non-Big 8 auditors averages around 30%. These results support that industry expertise is a dimension of the demand for higher quality Big 8 audits and a basis for within Big 8 product differentiation.

Diversified corporations have been widely criticized as being inefficient innovators with an orientation to maximizing short-term profits. This study investigates this criticism by testing whether the number of new products introduced per R&D dollar is lower among more diversified firms. We find no statistically discernible effect of diversification on innovative efficiency in a sample of 706 research-intensive firms in the 1981–1988 period. This suggests that diversified organizations are rationally designed to minimize incentive and communication problems which may hinder innovation. Consistent with this view, we find that diversified firms are more likely to have separate research and development centers.

Return models (returns regressed on scaled earnings variables) are commonly preferred to price models (stock price regressed on earnings per share). We provide a framework for choosing between these models. An economically intuitive rationale suggests that price models are better specified in that the estimated slope coefficients from price models, but not return models, are unbiased. Our empirical results confirm that price models' earnings response coefficients are less biased. However, return models have less serious econometric problems than price models. In some research contexts the combined use of both price and return models may be useful.

We extend Healy (1985) by examining the relation between discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms for the 1980–1990 period. Contrary to Healy, we find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound, managers select income-increasing discretionary accruals (and vice versa). We believe that our results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis than with Healy's bonus hypothesis. However, mechanical selection bias in portfolio formation cannot be entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for our results.

For a two-stage production process, two assignments of tasks among two agents are studied: an ‘assembly line’, where each agent is responsible for one stage, vs. a ‘team’, where agents are jointly responsible for all tasks. When attention paid to quality at the initial stage affects the final-stage task, the team approach is optimal for unsophisticated production technology. As technology improves, the assembly line becomes dominating while continued improvements eventually makes it optimal to abandon the assembly line again in favor of the team approach. When such switches in job design occur, the optimal investment in technology exhibits positive jumps.

Implementation methods mandated by the FASB allow firms to report equity-increasing changes as income and equity-decreasing changes as adjustments to stockholders' equity. These findings are consistent with the argument that the FASB, to reduce its political costs, attempts to minimize firms' costs of implementation. We find that the FASB permits flexibility in timing of adoption of mandated changes. Firms experiencing lower changes in return on assets (ROA) before adoption and expecting higher adoption income effects accelerate implementation. Early adopters select the year of adoption when their change in ROA is lowest and their change in leverage is highest.

This paper explores the determinants of corporate R&D for U.S., Canadian, British, European, and Japanese firms. We find last year's debt ratio is significantly negatively correlated with current R&D expenditures for U.S. firms, and positively for Japanese firms. Second, we document a significant positive relation between two-year lagged stock return and current R&D expenditures for U.S., European, Japanese, and large-size British firms. Finally, we find a significant positive relation between last year's tax payments and current R&D expenditures for Japanese firms, and a significant negative relation for medium-size and small-size U.S. firms.

Executive stock options differ from exchange-traded options because of vesting and portability restrictions. Executive departure from the firm forces early exercise, reducing the value of executive options. Current methodology calculates the option value by multiplying the Black-Scholes option price by the departure probability. This ignores the possibility that executive departure is less likely when stock price is high, and thus is correlated with the stock price. We show that this correlation implies a substantial increase in option values. A similar situation occurs in performance-based option packages, where the actual number of options granted depends on stock performance.

This study investigates the effects of state taxes and regulation on an organizational structure decision for expanding property-casualty insurers (subsidiary versus license). Tests are conducted of the relation between the organizational structure of 2,335 property-casualty insurers and state tax and regulatory conditions in 1991. Evidence is provided that property-casualty insurers structure their cross-state expansion to mitigate both state tax and regulatory costs.