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Individual Behavior and Group Membership

American Economic Review 2007 97(4), 1340-1352 open access
People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This paper shows that group membership affects preferences over outcomes, and saliency of the group affects the perception of the environment. We manipulate the saliency of group membership by letting a player's own group watch as a passive audience as decisions are made, and/or by making part of the payoff common for members of the group. In contrast to the minimal-group paradigm, minimal groups alone do not affect behavior in our strategic environments. However, salient group membership significantly increases the aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group members in the audience), and tends to reduce that of the guests.

An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2023 105(6), 1530-1543 open access
We examine how preplay communication and clustering affect play in a challenging hybrid experimental game on networks. Free-form chat is impressively effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome, but restricted communication has little effect. We support this result with a model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. We also offer a model of message diffusion that correctly predicts more rapid diffusion without clustering. We show an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. A remarkable result is that restricted communication is quite effective in a network stag hunt but not in our extended game.

Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection

Econometrica 2014 82(5), 1615-1670
In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. We examine behavior and equilibrium selection. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: (1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and (2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.

The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game

American Economic Review 2012 102(5), 2358-2379
This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility.

Exercise Improves Academic Performance

Journal of Political Economy 2026 134(1), 397-434 open access
In a randomized controlled trial, we test whether removal of a barrier to exercise can improve academic performance.We find strong support for this hypothesis: university students who were provided with a free gym card exercised more and had a significant improvement in academic performance.The treated students were both less likely to drop out of classes and to fail at the exam.We provide evidence showing that exercise caused a healthier lifestyle and increased perceived self-control, which ultimately improved academic performance.The study demonstrates that removing barriers to physical activity can be an important tool for improving educational achievements.