We show that name-induced stereotypes affect the investment choices of U.S. mutual fund investors. Managers with foreign-sounding names have about 10% lower annual fund flows, and this effect is stronger among funds with investor clienteles more likely to be suspicious of foreigners. Foreign-named managers experience lower appreciation (greater decline) in flows following good (bad) performance. Following 9/11, flows to funds with managers with Middle-Eastern-sounding names declined abnormally. In an experimental setting in which skill differences are absent, individuals allocate 11% less money to an index fund managed by a foreign-named manager. This gap widens following the Boston marathon bombings.

We show that chief executive officers (CEOs) of prestigious firms earn less. Total compensation is on average 8% lower for firms listed in Fortune’s ranking of America’s most admired companies. We suggest that CEOs are willing to trade off status and career benefits from working for a publicly admired company against additional monetary compensation. Our identification strategy is based on matched sample analyses, difference-in-differences regressions, and a regression discontinuity design. We perform several robustness checks and exclude many alternative explanations, including that firm prestige just proxies for better corporate governance or for increased exposure of the pay-setting process to media attention.

This article shows that mutual funds’ trading experiences bias their future repurchasing decisions. Mutual funds are less likely to repurchase a stock if they previously sold the stock for a loss rather than for a gain. After switching to managing a different fund, fund managers still avoid repurchasing stocks they sold for a loss at a past fund. We do not find that mutual fund managers are biased against repurchasing past loser stocks because of superior information. Though less likely to be repurchased, repurchased losers do not underperform repurchased winners—and the fund itself—in the subsequent quarter.

This paper shows that local institutional investors are effective monitors of corporate behavior. Firms with high local ownership have better internal governance and are more profitable. These firms are also less likely to manage their earnings aggressively or backdate options and are less likely to be targets of class action lawsuits. Further, managers of such firms exhibit a lower propensity to engage in “empire building” and are less likely to “lead the quiet life”. Examining the local monitoring mechanisms, we find that local institutions are more likely to introduce shareholder proposals, increase CEO turnover, and reduce excess CEO pay.

We examine whether corporate bankruptcies influence bank loan characteristics of geographically proximate firms. Controlling for industry contagion and local economic conditions, firms headquartered near a bankruptcy event experience a 7 basis point increase in loan spreads. The effect is transitory and cannot be fully explained by local correlated information or lenders’ financial health. Instead, the effect is more pronounced for informationally opaque bankruptcies and borrowers, and weakened among loans with relationship lenders and lenders with significant local presence.

We show that name-induced stereotypes affect the investment choices of U.S. mutual fund investors. Managers with foreign-sounding names have about 10% lower annual fund flows, and this effect is stronger among funds with investor clienteles more likely to be suspicious of foreigners. Foreign-named managers experience lower appreciation (greater decline) in flows following good (bad) performance. Following 9/11, flows to funds with managers with Middle-Eastern-sounding names declined abnormally. In an experimental setting in which skill differences are absent, individuals allocate 11% less money to an index fund managed by a foreign-named manager. This gap widens following the Boston marathon bombings.