Evidence suggests that the negotiated wage for a unionized employee group is an increasing function of the firm’s prior profitability. As a result, managers may have an incentive to strategically signal a negative outlook to their unionized workers in order to improve the firm’s bargaining position. I assess the strategy of missing mean consensus analysts’ earnings estimates as a way for managers to signal a negative outlook to their unionized employees. I find that unionized firms are more likely to miss estimates than their nonunionized counterparts. Additionally, this propensity to miss estimates is increasing in both the firm’s percentage of unionized employees and multiunionism, but is unaffected by the timing of the signal relative to contract renewal. Finally, the increased propensity to miss estimates appears to be driven by both differences in expectations management and earnings management across the two groups. Specifically, managers of unionized firms take less action than their nonunionized counterparts to guide forecasts downward when estimates are too high, and they take more action to deflate earnings when expectations are too low. Taken together, the findings suggest that managers do seek to project a negative outlook to their unions, and that this tendency is increasing in the union’s negotiation strength.

We develop a model to illustrate that equity-based compensation for non-executive employees and product market decisions are related. When the product market is competitive and employees have low bargaining power , the unique equilibrium is for each firm’s owners to offer equity-based compensation to their employees. In this setting, equity-based compensation leads to a lower wage rate, which makes each firm more competitive with its rival. However, this unique equilibrium is a Prisoner’s Dilemma for the firms’ original owners. Our results are consistent with several empirical regularities and provide predictions on when firms will offer equity-based compensation to their employees.

ABSTRACT Gray markets arise when a manufacturer's products are sold outside of its authorized channels, for instance when goods designated by a multinational firm for sale in a foreign market are resold domestically. One method multinationals use to combat gray markets is to increase transfer prices to foreign subsidiaries in order to increase the gray market's cost base. We illustrate that, when a gray market competitor exists, the optimal transfer price to a foreign subsidiary exceeds marginal cost and is decreasing in the competitiveness of the domestic market. However, a multinational's discretion in setting transfer prices may be limited by mandatory arm's length transfer pricing rules. Provided gray markets exist, we characterize when mandating arm's length transfer pricing lowers domestic social welfare relative to unrestricted transfer pricing. We also demonstrate that gray markets can lead to higher domestic tax revenues, even when gray market firms do not pay taxes domestically.

ABSTRACT We develop a mixed‐duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed about market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE commits to fully disclose its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to withhold its private information. When the disclosure equilibrium prevails, the private firm can be more profitable competing against an SOE than against another private firm. In this mixed‐duopoly setting, the equilibrium social welfare is maximized when the SOE puts a positive weight on both social welfare and its own profit. Our analysis has further implications for both mandatory disclosure and market entry.

This is a published manuscript of an article published by Wiley.

The costs and benefits of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 ( SOX ) have been oft‐debated since the inception of the Act. Much of the extant literature has assessed the costs and benefits of SOX to publicly traded companies. We focus on the costs of SOX compliance for private firms wanting to exit the private market via either an acquisition by a public firm or an IPO . Consistent with our predictions we establish two principal findings. First, SOX appears to have shifted the preferences of private firms from going public to exiting the private market via acquisition by a public acquirer. Second, private target deal multiples are increasing in variables that proxy for a private target's level of pre‐acquisition SOX compliance. These findings suggest that SOX ‐related costs have both restricted the action space of possible exit strategies for private firms and led to lower deal multiples for those private acquisition targets that are less likely to be SOX compliant prior to acquisition.

ABSTRACT Prior research documents a negative link between risk and executive holding of stock, but a corresponding positive link for options. We find a similar negative relation for non-executive holding of stock. Our finding is consistent with the view that non-executives not only face significant incentives to reduce risk when they hold stock, but they are also able to affect corporate risk. While endogeneity cannot be ruled out fully, the results of a battery of tests suggest that it plays a limited role. A second robust result is that the documented relation becomes more negative as option-based executive compensation increases. Overall, corporate risk is related to the incentives created by stock and options held by both executives and non-executives, as well as interactions among those incentives. JEL Classifications: G30.