We study the effect of a bond’s place in its issuer’s maturity structure on credit risk. Using a structural model as motivation, we argue that bonds due relatively late in their issuers’ maturity structure have greater credit risk than do bonds due relatively early. Empirically, we find robust evidence that these later bonds have larger yield spreads and greater comovement with equity and that the magnitude of the effects is consistent with model predictions for investment-grade bonds. Our results highlight the importance of bond-specific credit risk for understanding corporate bond prices.

[We find that the empirical volatilities of corporate bond and CDS returns are higher than implied by equity return volatilities and the Merton model. This excess volatility may arise because structural models inadequately capture either fundamentals or illiquidity. Our evidence supports the latter explanation. We find little relation between excess volatility and measures of firm fundamentals and the volatility of firm fundamentals but some relation with variables proxying for time-varying illiquidity. Consistent with an illiquidity explanation, firm-level bond portfolio returns, which average out bond-specific effects, significantly decrease excess volatility.]

[We document a significant investment bank fixed effect in the announcement returns of M&A deals. The interquartile range of bank fixed effects is 1.26%, compared with a full-sample average return of 0.72%. The results remain significant after controlling for the component of returns attributable to the acquirer. Our findings suggest that investment banks matter for M&A outcomes, and contrast earlier studies that show no positive link between various measures of advisor quality and M&A returns. Differences in average returns across banks are also persistent over time and predictable from prior performance. Clients do not chase past returns, which may explain why persistence exists in M&A performance while it is absent in mutual funds.]

We study the effect of a bond’s place in its issuer’s maturity structure on credit risk. Using a structural model as motivation, we argue that bonds due relatively late in their issuers’ maturity structure have greater credit risk than do bonds due relatively early. Empirically, we find robust evidence that these later bonds have larger yield spreads and greater comovement with equity and that the magnitude of the effects is consistent with model predictions for investment-grade bonds. Our results highlight the importance of bond-specific credit risk for understanding corporate bond prices. Received January 1, 2016; editorial decision June 6, 2017 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

We find that the empirical volatilities of corporate bond and CDS returns are higher than implied by equity return volatilities and the Merton model. This excess volatility may arise because structural models inadequately capture either fundamentals or illiquidity. Our evidence supports the latter explanation. We find little relation between excess volatility and measures of firm fundamentals and the volatility of firm fundamentals but some relation with variables proxying for time-varying illiquidity. Consistent with an illiquidity explanation, firm-level bond portfolio returns, which average out bond-specific effects, significantly decrease excess volatility.

We document a significant investment bank fixed effect in the announcement returns of M&A deals. The interquartile range of bank fixed effects is 1.26%, compared with a full-sample average return of 0.72%. The results remain significant after controlling for the component of returns attributable to the acquirer. Our findings suggest that investment banks matter for M&A outcomes, and contrast earlier studies that show no positive link between various measures of advisor quality and M&A returns. Differences in average returns across banks are also persistent over time and predictable from prior performance. Clients do not chase past returns, which may explain why persistence exists in M&A performance while it is absent in mutual funds.

Focusing on downgrades as stress events that drive the selling of corporate bonds, we show that the illiquidity of stressed bonds has increased after the Volcker Rule. Dealers regulated by the rule have curtailed their market-making activities and non-Volcker-affected dealers have not offset the decreased activities of Volcker-affected dealers. Furthermore, even Volcker-affected dealers that are not constrained by Basel III and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review regulations change their behavior, inconsistent with the effects being driven by these other regulations. Because Volcker-affected dealers have been the main liquidity providers, bonds have become less liquid during times of stress due to the Volcker Rule.

We construct a measure of systematic default defined as the probability that many firms default at the same time. We account for correlations in defaults between firms through exposures to common shocks. Systematic default spikes during recessions, is correlated with macroeconomic indicators, and predicts future realized defaults. More importantly, it predicts future equity and corporate bond index returns both in- and out-of-sample. Finally, we find that the cross-section of average stock returns is related to firm-level exposures to systematic default risk.

This paper examines the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its asset‐pricing implications. Using transactions data from 2003 to 2009, we show that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid–ask spreads. We establish a strong link between bond illiquidity and bond prices. In aggregate, changes in market‐level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high‐rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshadowing the credit risk component. In the cross‐section, the bond‐level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yield spreads with large economic significance.