Subchapter C of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code levies an entity‐level tax on corporate profits, whereas Subchapter S allows corporations meeting specific criteria to elect out of this tax. Despite these differences, C and S corporations regularly compete for customers and capital. We examine whether and the extent to which competition from S corporations influences the future organizational form choice of rival C corporations and explore outcomes of this choice. Using data for 4,462 private U.S. commercial banks grouped by Metropolitan Statistical Area during 1997–2010, we find that greater competition from S corporation banks increases the likelihood that rival C corporation banks convert to Subchapter S status. We estimate that the aggregate first‐year tax savings from S conversion exceed $372 million. Consistent with these savings being used to maintain competitive parity with rivals, we find that converting banks increase their interest rates on customer deposits and advertising intensity. Our findings provide insight into whether competition from tax‐advantaged firms influences the organizational form choice of rival tax‐disadvantaged firms.

We examine shareholders' perceptions about how external tax advisors contribute to corporate tax planning. As residual claimants of corporate tax planning, shareholders benefit from lower corporate taxes, but also bear the financial and reputational costs of subsequent tax enforcement. Despite the influential advisory role of external tax advisors in corporate tax planning, existing research on how shareholders perceive this role is limited. Using event study methods and exploiting the heightened regulation of tax advice through the covered opinion rules as a setting, we observe average and cross‐sectional stock returns consistent with shareholders perceiving external tax advisors as contributing unfavorably to tax planning by promoting excessively risky strategies. We further find that risky and overall tax planning declined across firms after the enactment of the rules, consistent with shareholders' perceptions about tax advisors' contributions to firms' tax planning. Overall, our findings contribute to research on shareholder perceptions and valuation of tax planning, and have important implications for practice, where regulatory oversight of external tax advisors remains a significant concern.

This study investigates how sophisticated market participants use tax‐based information by examining whether analysts' street effective tax rates (ETRs) are informative. When assessing firm performance, analysts exclude items they believe do not reflect current performance, resulting in “street” metrics such as street ETR. However, evidence on the properties of the components of street earnings is limited. Examining the informativeness of street ETRs is important because taxes are a significant component of earnings, and the extent to which analysts understand taxes and incorporate them into their analyses is not clear. Using a hand‐collected sample of analyst reports, we find that while approximately 35% of street ETRs have at least one tax‐specific exclusion, over 90% reflect the tax effects of pre‐tax exclusions. Further, both tax‐specific exclusions and the tax effects of pre‐tax exclusions significantly contribute to differences between GAAP and street ETRs. Consistent with analysts' understanding of the implications of tax and nontax exclusions, our results suggest that street tax metrics exhibit greater predictive ability about future tax outcomes and provide more information to investors than GAAP tax metrics. We also find that ETR exclusions are of higher quality when the magnitude of the potentially excluded item is greater and when managers disclose pro forma earnings. Collectively, our findings suggest that analysts understand taxes, but selectively exert effort to incorporate tax‐based information into their assessment of firm performance. Our study should be informative to regulators and users of financial information because it provides evidence regarding the usefulness of street earnings metrics.

Prior research shows that contingent liabilities do not accurately predict future cash payments due to the managerial discretion afforded by accounting standards. We examine the extent to which current accounting guidance for a material contingent liability—the reserve for unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) under Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48)—generates accruals that are predictive of future income tax cash outflows. We document that UTBs fully unwind as cash tax payments over the subsequent 5 years, suggesting that managers, on average, accurately incorporate their expectations of future tax liabilities. This result persists for firms that are (1) most affected by the implementation of FIN 48, (2) unable to impound detection risk into their reserves, (3) engaged in relatively more ex ante tax avoidance, (4) suspected to have engaged in earnings management through the tax accounts, and (5) subject to plausibly exogenous shocks to tax reporting. Overall, our results suggest that current accounting guidance under FIN 48 for contingent tax liabilities enables managers to accurately report, and financial statement users to reliably predict, future cash obligations.

We reexamine the positive association between stock option vega and earnings management previously documented by Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013; henceforth, ALOT). In contrast to ALOT, prior empirical research and practitioner literature emphasizes earnings management's goals of increasing stock price and reducing volatility. Specifically, we assess whether the association is robust to (i) employing discretionary accruals that are less prone to misspecification, (ii) focusing on a more recent time period, and (iii) including additional controls for period‐specific factors. Our main findings are as follows. First, we fail to find a positive association between vega and earnings management after controlling for performance‐related misspecification in discretionary accruals. Second, we find no association between vega and earnings management in a more recent time period, suggesting the results of ALOT may be sensitive to period‐specific factors. Last, the positive association vanishes when we control for year fixed effects, growth opportunities, or monitoring, suggesting the original results of ALOT's research may be sensitive to correlated, omitted variables. Overall, our results question the extent to which vega incentivizes earnings management. Our results may be of interest to boards of directors in designing executive compensation contracts, to regulators in crafting policies that maintain high levels of financial reporting quality, and to researchers seeking to identify settings where earnings management incentives are most salient.

We examine how executive equity incentives are associated with firms' conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance is unique compared to nonconforming tax avoidance in that it decreases tax liabilities by reducing pretax income. Thus, conforming tax avoidance presents a unique set of consequences with important links to both risk and value‐creation incentives. Consistent with risk‐taking incentives increasing conforming tax avoidance, we find that linking executive wealth to stock price volatility (i.e., vega) is positively associated with conforming tax avoidance. We also find that linking executive wealth to stock price (i.e., delta) is negatively associated with conforming tax avoidance. The results of our cross‐sectional tests suggest that the negative association between delta and conforming tax avoidance is predominantly driven by a risk aversion effect rather than a value‐creation effect. Our findings add to the literature on the relation between tax avoidance and executive compensation, as well as the trade‐off between book and taxable income.

We examine how the shifting of legal liability between auditors and clients affects financial reporting quality. We exploit the state-level adoption and rejection of a common law doctrine, the Audit Interference Rule (AIR), which shifts legal liability between auditors and clients, while not affecting total legal liability. The likelihood of restatements declines following staggered rejections of the AIR that shift risk to clients. Path analysis indicates that audit fees increase following AIR rejections, suggesting that relatively greater liability exposure for clients leads to a greater demand for assurance services that, in turn, reduces the likelihood of restatements. We further find greater improvements in financial reporting quality following the rejections of the AIR among clients with higher litigation risk and larger clients. Broadly, we provide novel evidence that clients’ incentives relating to increased liability exposure appear to dominate auditors’ disincentives relating to decreased liability exposure on financial reporting quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

This study examines the tax avoidance behavior of firms prior to the issuance, and following the resolution, of SEC tax comment letters. We find that firms that appear to engage in greater tax avoidance are more likely to receive a tax-related SEC comment letter. We also find that firms receiving a tax-related SEC comment letter, relative to firms receiving a non-tax comment letter, subsequently decrease their tax avoidance behavior consistent with an increase in expected tax costs. Additionally, we document evidence consistent with other firms that do not receive a comment letter reacting to multiple publicly disclosed tax-related comment letters within their industry by increasing their reported GAAP ETR, consistent with an indirect effect of regulatory scrutiny on certain types of tax avoidance.

Product market power provides firms with comparative advantages through more persistent profitability and insulation from competitive threats. These advantages likely provide firms with the ability to engage in greater tax avoidance. We present evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We also show that firms mimic the tax outcomes of their product market leaders. Among firms with greater product market power and comparatively high cash tax avoidance, we find stock prices to be less informative and that investors require additional compensation for the risks associated with comparatively high cash tax avoidance. Our results survive numerous robustness tests. Overall, our results suggest that industry dynamics, particularly related to a firm's competitive position, play a meaningful role in corporate tax policy.