This study investigates whether financial data providers serve as information intermediaries in capital markets. To this end, I examine whether the timeliness of earnings information disseminated by First Call (Thomson Reuters) affects the market’s reaction to earnings announcements. I document that the immediate price and volume response is weaker and the post-earnings-announcement drift stronger for earnings news disseminated with a delay by First Call. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I study the market reaction on the day of the delayed dissemination and show that a significant part of the stronger drift is clustered around this day.

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.

We analyze how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique data set containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the German hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy fewer (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. Moreover, we document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations, such as consumption needs, are unlikely to drive our results.

We study the impact of financial advice on retirement savings. We document that advisors help clients to prepare for retirement by inducing them to take advantage of tax incentives offered on retirement accounts. Advisors particularly promote retirement funds as compared to savings accounts. After-tax returns of advisor-induced retirement fund investments exceed returns of plausible alternative investments. We find no indication that advisor-induced contributions to retirement accounts lead to negative side effects, such as reductions in other savings or liquidity constraints. Hence, we provide evidence of a bright side of financial advice. Furthermore, investments in retirement funds increase bank profits, pointing toward a win–win situation with rent-sharing between the bank and its clients. However, advisors do not in particular target clients that are at a higher risk of under-saving for retirement, such as female clients, clients with lower wealth, and less-educated clients.

We use a dataset from a large retail bank to examine the impact of financial advice on investors’ stock trading performance and behavioral biases. Our data allow us to classify each individual trade as either advised or independent and to compare them in a trade-by-trade within-person analysis. Thus, our study is not plagued by the endogeneity problems typically faced by studies on financial advice. We document that advisors hurt trading performance. However, they help to reduce some of the behavioral biases retail investors are subject to, but this does not overcompensate the negative performance effects of the bad stock recommendations.

We use a unique data set from a large retail bank containing internal managerial Accounting data on revenues and costs per client to analyze how banks and their financial advisors generate profits with customers. We find that advised transactions are associated with higher profits than independently executed trades of the same client. The bank’s own mutual funds and structured products are most profitable for the bank, and profits increase with trade size. We show that advisors recommend exactly those transactions. Furthermore, we find that advised clients achieve a worse performance than independent clients, suggesting that advisors put their employer’s interest first.