By examining board appointments of outside directors who have previously fired a CEO, we study how directors’ willingness to take disciplinary actions is related to a firm's performance and risk-taking. Such directors (‘disciplinary directors’) appear to benefit firms with weak monitoring, but hurt firms in innovative industries. Firms appointing a disciplinary director subsequently exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and R&D expense, make fewer acquisitions, and are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs. Overall, disciplinary directors appear to influence managerial behavior and shareholder wealth.

In response to corporate governance concerns, SEC disclosure rules, and pressure from Institutional Shareholder Services, most large U.S. public firms have adopted executive stock ownership requirements (‘SORs’) in recent years. Compared to CEOs already in compliance, CEOs who have not yet fulfilled the requirement at adoption subsequently increase stockholdings, exposing themselves to more company-specific risk, potentially providing risk-reduction incentives and diminishing their subjective valuation of firm equity. We find that these CEOs on average subsequently reduce firm risk through diversifying M&A, less financial leverage, and smaller R&D investment. They experience a deterioration in firm performance and valuation, each associated with firms that do reduce risk, but receive significantly increased stock grants. Our evidence suggests that boards should exercise judgment when adopting this popular governance initiative.

Abstract Using 9,801 director appointments during 2003–2014, we document the dramatic impact of connections. Sixty-nine percent of new directors have professional ties to incumbent boards, a group representing 13% of all potential candidates. Consistent with facilitating coordination and reducing search costs, connections help boards bring in gender diversity, new skills, and new industry background. More complex firms and firms in more competitive environments tend to appoint connected directors and experience better market reactions and higher shareholder votes. Connections to incumbent CEOs, however, result in lower announcement returns and shareholder votes. We use death (merger)-induced network loss (gain) as instruments.

Acquirer CEOs with experience in the target's industry supply chain (‘supply chain CEOs’) are associated with wealth effects of first-order importance: they earn 1.5% higher merger announcement returns. Conversely, their targets get a lower share of the merger gains. Acquisitions by supply chain CEOs also exhibit higher synergies, better post-deal accounting performance, and less goodwill written off. These findings withstand checks for endogeneity, anticipation bias, and numerous robustness tests. In takeovers by supply chain CEOs, superior acquirer performance stems from both value creation and rents negotiated away from target shareholders.

Abstract Motivated by Coles, Li, and Wang (2020)’s prediction that industry tournament incentives are linked to heightened risk-seeking behavior, we examine whether these incentives contribute positively to systemic risk. Using a measure of systemic risk that captures the cross-sectional tail dependency between the US financial system and individual financial institutions, we find that the external pay gap is positively related to an institution’s contribution to systemic risk. Consistent with our expectation, industry tournament incentives are positively associated with individual financial institutions’ stock return volatility, Value at Risk, and crash risk, thus indirectly contributing to systemic risk due to financial institutions’ inherent interconnectedness. More interestingly, the external pay gap is positively related to an institution’s financial industry beta and encourages systemically risky activities, suggesting an important impact channel through institutions’ undertaking correlated activities.