Using the staggered adoption of U.S. state-level pay transparency laws that improve pay transparency, we find that the probability of high-wage workers becoming entrepreneurs significantly increases following the adoption of such laws. Moreover, the salaries of high-wage workers significantly increase following the laws’ passage. These findings are consistent with theory suggesting that improved pay transparency increases the relative return of entrepreneurship for high-wage workers.

Exploiting the staggered adoption of U.S. state-level labor protection laws, we find that household mortgage debt increases following the passage of these laws. Our findings are consistent with theories predicting that better employment protection reduces households’ layoff risk, making lenders less concerned about borrowers’ ability to repay their debts and more inclined to offer them mortgage loans. Supporting this channel, we find that the loan approval rate increases following the adoption of labor protection laws and that the effect of the laws’ adoption on mortgage debt is concentrated in old households.

In this paper, we provide the first firm-level evidence on the importance of culture, and its interdependence with legal (formal) institutions in affecting firms' use of external financing to fund growth. We conjecture that culture, after controlling for its macro-economic impact through political and legal institutions, has a direct micro-economic effect on firm-level growth. Using an international sample of 42,341 firms from 56 countries over the period 1989 to 2012, we find support for our hypothesis that cultural dimensions of individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and power distance affect firm's ability to overcome financial constraints, with individualism exhibiting a strong robust impact compared to the other dimensions. We further find that the link between individualism and growth is stronger in countries with low access to finance, suggesting that firms' ability to overcome financial constraints is more affected by individualism when access to finance is lower.

Using a large sample of privatized firms, we find that state ownership is significantly positively associated with the use of bank debt financing, suggesting that privatized firms benefit from the soft budget constraint associated with state ownership. We further find that the relation is more pronounced in countries with high government ownership of banks, high corruption in bank lending, a left-oriented government, and a collectivist national culture, which provides additional support for the soft-budget-constraint view. Finally, in external validity tests, we find that state ownership affects other aspects of debt structure, such as debt maturity and debt security.

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) raises firms' incentives to lobby policymakers to access policy information and influence policy outcomes. Surprisingly, we find that non-lobbying firms are less likely to initiate lobbying during periods of heightened EPU. The evidence is consistent with our time-varying barriers hypothesis that entry barriers to lobbying increase with EPU. We verify that the negative effect of EPU on lobbying initiation arises through the channels of lobbying entry expenses and returns to experience. Furthermore, lobbying entry expenses are not large, implying that the returns to experience channel is likely a more serious barrier preventing non-lobbying firms from initiating lobbying. We also find that facing high lobbying entry barriers, non-lobbying firms go for alternative political activities, such as hiring politically connected directors.

Using a cross-country sample of 406 non-financial firms in 44 countries, we examine, based on firm and country level data, the decisions of governments to resort to gradual, staggered sales that result in full privatization. We report that 168 firms over the 1995–2009 period were fully privatized. It takes seven years on average for a government to completely privatize an SOE. Using the Cox proportional hazard model, we find that full privatization is a slower process in collectivist societies and when political constraints and employment protection laws are more stringent. Finally, we document a positive effect of full privatization on firm outcomes (namely, risk-taking, efficiency, profitability, and growth), supporting previous theoretical and empirical arguments that full relinquishment of control and ownership is required in order to change firms’ objectives.

We examine the influence of political rights on the implied cost of equity capital using a sample of firms from 44 countries. We find that firms' equity financing costs are lower when political rights are stronger. We further find that political institutions' direct impact on the cost of equity capital is incremental to that of legal institutions. Economically, our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in political rights is associated with a 38 basis point decrease in corporate cost of equity capital. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political rights on equity pricing is more pronounced in countries with weak legal institutions.

We investigate the extent of political connections in newly privatized firms. Using a sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 1980 to 2002, we find that 87 firms have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors. Politically-connected firms are generally incorporated in major cities, are highly leveraged, and operate in regulated sectors. The likelihood of observing political connections in these firms is positively related to government residual ownership, and negatively related to foreign ownership. Political fractionalization and tenure, as well as judicial independence are also key explanatory variables. Finally, politically-connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared to their non-connected counterparts.

Using a unique database of 381 newly privatized firms from 57 countries, we investigate the impact of shareholders' identity on corporate risk-taking behavior. We find strong and robust evidence that state (foreign) ownership is negatively (positively) related to corporate risk-taking. Moreover, we find that high risk-taking by foreign owners depends on the strength of country-level governance institutions. Our results suggest that relinquishment of government control, openness to foreign investment, and improvement of country-level governance institutions are key determining factors of corporate risk-taking in newly privatized firms.

Using the staggered adoption of collateral law reforms across Europe, we examine their effects on trade credit financing. We find that firms in countries that adopt such reforms receive less trade credit, consistent with suppliers viewing these firms as less creditworthy. Moreover, this decrease in trade credit is more pronounced for firms and industries with more movable assets, for financially constrained firms, and for firms in countries with strong legal enforcement, indicating that collateralization of movable assets drives this relation. Our findings suggest that the use of movable assets as collateral in bank borrowing increases supplier risks and decreases demand for trade credit, thus discouraging its use.