We study the dynamics of trading volume and bid-ask spread using a multiperiod trading model with oligopolistic market makers. Traders smooth out their trading even though they are not strategic, and thus trading persists after the arrival of information or liquidity shocks. Traders act quickly on their private information while postponing hedging trades until later periods. The market power of market makers enables them to widen bid-ask spreads when trading incentives are heightened. Consequently, both trading volume and bid-ask spread may exhibit U-shaped patterns. Our model calibration aligns with the empirical intraday patterns observed in bid-ask spreads and trading volumes. (JEL D53, D61, D82, G12, G14, G18)

The intergenerational earnings mobility of Canadians born to immigrants is examined using the 2001 Census. A detailed portrait of the Canadian population is offered as are estimates of the degree of generational mobility among the children of immigrants from seventy countries. The degree of intergenerational persistence is about the same for immigrants as for the entire population, and there is more generational mobility among immigrants in Canada than in the United States. We also use quantile regressions to distinguish between the role of social capital from other constraints limiting mobility and find that these are present.

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We examine the effects of a temporary suspension of short-sale price tests on the options market. Consistent with the notion that put option trading substitutes for short selling, we find a significant reduction in put option volume. In addition, pressure on put option prices significantly declines, violations of the put-call parity become significantly less frequent, and option volume becomes less informed. Our findings add clarity to a long-standing debate on whether investors use options to circumvent equity short-selling restrictions.

This study investigates the effect of managerial sentiment on corporate disclosure decisions. Using terrorist attacks in the United States as adverse shocks to managerial sentiment, we find that firms located in the metropolitan areas attacked issue more negatively biased earnings forecasts. The effect is stronger for firms with higher operating uncertainty and firms with younger, inexperienced, or less confident executives and it is weaker for firms located in states with increasing violent crime rates. A potential alternative explanation is that managers strategically bias earnings forecasts downward and attribute the poor performance to terrorist attacks. To address this issue, we conduct a battery of additional analyses and find results more consistent with managerial sentiment than strategic attribution. In addition, we show that our results are unlikely to be driven by any economic effects of terrorist attacks. Finally, firms in attacked areas exhibit a more pessimistic tone in 10-K/10-Q filings.

In this article we examine whether and how changes in personal bankruptcy laws, viewed as a shock to employees’ expected personal wealth, affect corporate policies. Following a reform in personal bankruptcy laws that limits individuals’ access to bankruptcy protection, firms more affected by this regulation reform increase labor costs, reduce investment, and engage in less risk taking. The effects are stronger when employees have more bargaining power. Furthermore, firms in industries characterized by high unemployment risk reduce leverage. These results support the view that firms choose more conservative policies to mitigate employees’ expected welfare losses.

ABSTRACT Exploiting the setting of staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) in U.S. state courts, we examine how quasi-exogenous restrictions of outside employment opportunities affect CEO compensation structure. The IDD adoption constrains executives' ability to work for competitors, which likely decreases CEOs' tendency to take risks by increasing the cost of job loss and reducing the reward to risk taking. We expect the board to respond by increasing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) to encourage risk taking. We find a significant increase in vega post-IDD adoption. The effect is stronger among CEOs with greater career concerns. The effect also increases with the ex ante CEO mobility and the importance of trade secrets, suggesting the board increases vega more when there is a greater reduction in CEO outside opportunities. Overall, we provide new evidence on how external labor market frictions affect the convexity of CEO compensation. JEL Classifications: G32; M12; J60.