Can fintech close the gender gap in access to financial services? Using novel survey data for 28 countries, this paper finds a large and ubiquitous ‘fintech gender gap’: while 29% of men use fintech products, only 21% of women do. This difference exceeds the gender gap in bank account ownership at traditional financial institutions. While country characteristics and individual-level controls explain about a third of the fintech gender gap, the residual gap declines by 60% when accounting for gender differences in the willingness to use new financial technology, the suitability of fintech products, and the willingness to use fintech entrants if they offer cheaper products. The paper concludes by discussing drivers of differences in attitudes and implications for policy to foster financial inclusion with new technology

We investigate the patterns and performance of banks’ investments in fintech ventures in the United States. We document that banks, as compared to independent venture capitalists (IVCs), invest a larger proportion in fintech startups and achieve a higher IPO exit rate. The better exit performance is neither explained by banks’ tendency to invest in later-round or larger deals, nor contributed by banks’ following successful peer IVCs. Banks’ outperformance is mainly concentrated in fin-native fintech startups and those whose business operations overlap with banks’ core business segments, which is consistent with the corporate venture capital (CVC) literature and the conjecture that banks possess unique industry expertise that facilitates their selection of fintech startups. In addition, banks participate more on the boards of fintech startups than of other ventures, implying that the better investment performance is not purely driven by selection

After exogenous demand shocks caused by natural disasters, FinTech lenders are more responsive to increased demand for reconstruction mortgages than traditional banks and non-FinTech shadow banks. Both FinTech and traditional banks increase credit supply, but FinTech supply is more elastic without increases in risk-adjusted interest rates or delinquency rates. Comparing lending supply channels, banks respond to regulatory incentives to lend to damaged areas, whereas FinTech lenders supply more credit when traditional banks rely more on balance sheet financing and physical branch networks. Compared to traditional banks, FinTech lenders increase supply elasticity more aggressively in response to local competitive pressure

This paper analyzes the links between advances in financial technology, investors’ sophistication, and the composition and returns of their financial portfolios. We develop a simple portfolio choice model under asymmetric information and derive some theoretical predictions. Using detailed microdata from Banca d’Italia, we test these predictions for Italian households over the period 2004-2020. In general, heterogeneity in portfolio composition and in returns between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors grows with improvements in financial technology. This heterogeneity is reduced only if financial technology is accessible to everyone and if investors have a similar capacity to use it

In the $793 billion Paycheck Protection Program, we examine metrics related to potential misreporting including nonregistered businesses, multiple businesses at residential addresses, abnormally high implied compensation per employee, and large inconsistencies with jobs reported in another government program. These measures consistently concentrate in certain FinTech lenders and are cross‐verified by seven additional measures. FinTech market share increased significantly over time, and suspicious lending by FinTechs in 2021 is four times the level at the start of the program. Suspicious loans are being overwhelmingly forgiven at rates similar to other loans

Fintech and big tech companies are making rapid inroads into credit markets. We hand construct a global database of fintech and big tech lending volumes for 79 countries over 2013–2018. Using a panel regression analysis, we find these new forms of digital lending are larger in countries with higher GDP per capita (albeit at a declining rate), where banking sector mark-ups are higher, and where banking regulation is less stringent. We also find that these alternative forms of credit are more developed where the ease of doing business is greater, investor protection disclosure and the efficiency of the judicial system are more advanced, and where bond and equity markets are more developed. Overall, fintech and big tech credit seem to complement other forms of credit, rather than substitute for them

We examine how financial technology affects households in terms of personal bankruptcy by leveraging exogenous variation in marketplace credit supply to Connecticut and New York residents. We document a persistent rise in bankruptcies in the affected states following sharp decreases in marketplace lending, particularly among low-income households and in areas where marketplace loans for financing medical bills are severely rationed. Borrowers’ indebtedness or local economic conditions do not explain the results. The supply of other consumer credit by banks and finance companies remains unaffected, suggesting that the observed increase in bankruptcies arises principally from reversing access to marketplace credit

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented to by customers who generate the data, with the regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks’ customer transaction data enables better borrower screening for fintechs. Open banking promotes competition if it helps level the playing field for all lenders in screening borrowers; however, if it over-empowers fintechs, it can also hinder competition and leave all borrowers worse off. Due to the credit quality inference from borrowers’ sign-up decisions, this remains true even if borrowers have the control of whether to share their banking data. We also study extensions with fintech affinities and data sharing on borrower preferences

The 2020 CARES Act directed large cash payments to households. We analyze households’ spending responses using data from a Fintech nonprofit, exploring heterogeneity by income, recent income declines, and liquidity as well as linked survey responses about economic expectations. Households respond rapidly to payments, with spending increasing by about $0.14 per dollar during the first week and plateauing around 0.25–0.30 over 3 months. In contrast to previous stimulus programs, we see little response of durables spending. Households with lower incomes, greater income declines, and less liquidity display stronger responses whereas households that expect employment losses and benefit cuts display weaker responses

Financial markets have a central role in allocating resources in modern economies. One of the main functions of financial markets is the discovery of information. This information in turn helps guide decisions in the real side of the economy. The literature on the “feedback effect” of financial markets explores this channel. Empirical work tries to identify the informational feedback from markets to corporate decisions. Theoretical work explores implications that this feedback effect has for the equilibrium in financial markets and for economic efficiency. Current trends in information technology under the FinTech revolution change the nature of information processing in financial markets and so may change the nature of the feedback effect. In this article, I review the main themes of this developing literature and connect them to the current information revolution. I also discuss directions for future research