Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.

This study uses Treasury bond triplets, which consist of three different Treasury issues with a common maturity date, to investigate the theoretical and empirical influence of tax strategies on Treasury prices. The tax-option effect, which arises from the right to optimally realize gains and losses for tax purposes, is found to induce convexity in the relation among triplet bond prices, but the effect is too small to create an arbitrage opportunity. A previous study [Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984)] is shown to incorrectly isolate the tax-option effect and hence misstate some key result; a correction is provided.

Emerging markets are characterized by volatile, but substantial returns that can easily exceed 75% per annum. Balancing these lofty returns are liquidity costs that, using the bid–ask spread as a basis, range from 1% for the Taiwanese market to over 47% for the Russian market. However, the paucity of bid–ask spread information across countries and time requires the use of liquidity estimates in emerging markets even though little is known about the efficacy of these estimates in measuring bid–ask spread costs. Using firm-level quoted bid–ask spreads as a basis, I find that price-based liquidity measures of Lesmond et al. [Review of Financial Studies 12 (1999) 1113] and Roll [Journal of Finance 39 (1984) 1127] perform better at representing cross-country liquidity effects than do volume based liquidity measures. Within-country liquidity is best measured with the liquidity estimates of either Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka or, to a lesser extent, Amihud (2002). Examining the impact of legal origin and political institutions on liquidity levels shows that countries with weak political and legal institutions have significantly higher liquidity costs than do countries with strong political and legal systems, even to the exclusion of legal origin or insider trading enforcement. Higher incremental political risk is associated with a 10 basis point increase in transaction costs, using the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka estimate, or a 1.9% increase in price impact costs, using the Amihud estimate.

We make two contributions to the study of interest rates. The first is to characterize their dynamics in a new way. We estimate forecasting relations based on one-period changes in forward rates, which are more easily compared than earlier work on yields to the stationary theory of bond pricing. The second is to approximate these dynamics and other salient features of interest rates with an affine model. We show that models with “negative” factors come closer to accounting for the properties of interest rates, including their dynamics, than multifactor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross models.

We examine the incidence of disciplinary events that reduce the control of current managers, and corporate restructuring among firms experiencing a large decline in operating performance during an active takeover period (1985–1988) and a less active period (1989–1992). We document a significant decline in the disciplinary events from the active to the less active period that is driven by a significant decline in disciplinary takeovers, those takeovers that result in a top executive change. Following the performance decline, however, there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring, and a significant improvement in operating performance, during both the active and the less active takeover period. We conclude that, although some managerial disciplinary events are related to overall takeover activity, the decline in takeover activity does not result in fewer performance-enhancing restructurings following performance declines.

Pension funds have pursued an active role in corporate governance, although some question their effectiveness and motivations. We examine the impact and motivation of pension fund activism by studying the shareholder proposals of the largest, most active funds from 1987 through 1993. We find significant heterogeneity across funds in activism objectives, tactics, and impact on target firms, consistent with differing investment strategies. We find the funds are more successful at monitoring and promoting change in target firms than previously recognized. We also find no evidence to support motivations other than fund value maximization.

We examine the equity ownership structure and board composition of a sample of 583 firms over the ten-year period 1983–1992. Our evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of firms exhibit large changes in ownership and board structure in any given year. These changes are correlated with one another and are not reversed in subsequent years. Ownership and board changes are strongly related to top executive turnover, prior stock price performance, and corporate control threats, but only weakly related to changes in firm-specific determinants of ownership and board structure. Furthermore, large ownership changes are typically preceded by economic shocks and followed by asset restructurings.

This study examines the empirical relation between stock returns and (long-run) dividend yields. The findings show that much of the phenomenon is due to a nonlinear relation between dividend yields and returns in January. Regression coefficients on dividend yields, which some models predict should be non-zero due to differential taxation of dividends and capital gains, exhibit a significant January seasonal, even when controlling for size. This finding is significant since there are no provisions in the after-tax asset pricing models that predict the tax differential is more important in January than in other months.

Longstaff (1992) and Edleson, Fehr, and Mason (1993) examine option values implicit in callable Treasury bonds and report a significant puzzle: implied option values are frequently negative. Using an alternative approach, we reexamine this issue and find that implied option values are generally positive, and, in contrast to previous studies, instances of option values sufficiently negative to overcome the bid-ask spread are rare. We explain the findings in other studies by showing that the method used may lead to the appearance of a negative option value when the true value is positive.

To short a stock, an arbitrageur must first borrow it. This paper describes the market for borrowing and lending U.S. equities, emphasizing the conditions generating and sustaining short-sale constraints. A large institutional lending intermediary provided eighteen months (4/2000–9/2001) of data on loan supply (“shortability”), loan fees (“specialness”), and loan recalls. The data suggest that while loan market specials and recalls are rare on average, the incidence of these short-sale constraints is increasing in the divergence of opinion among investors. Beyond some threshold, investor optimism itself can limit arbitrage via the loan market mechanism.