1 We solve a model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents that generates a large equity premium, while simultaneously matching stock market participation and indi-vidual asset holdings. The high risk premium is driven by incomplete risk sharing among stockholders, which results from the combination of aggregate uncertainty, borrowing con-straints and a (realistically) calibrated life-cycle earnings profile subject to idiosyncratic shocks. We show that it is challenging to simultaneously match asset pricing moments and individual portfolio decisions, while limited participation has a negligible impact on the risk premium, contrary to the results of models where it is imposed exogenously.

Using a calibrated, collective life-cycle portfolio choice model for a dual-income couple, we show that an increase in the ability to share risk within the household due to a mean-preserving spread in the partners’ coefficients of relative risk aversion leads to a substantial increase in financial risk-taking. Importantly, we show that risk sharing has a larger economic impact on portfolio choice than risk diversification. While unitary models usually do not fully replicate the optimal portfolio choice of collective models, we propose approximations that work reasonably well for moderate background risk. We provide strong empirical support for our key findings.

We show that a life-cycle model with realistically calibrated uninsurable labor income risk and moderate risk aversion can simultaneously match stock market participation rates and asset allocation decisions conditional on participation. The key ingredients of the model are Epstein–Zin preferences, a fixed stock market entry cost, and moderate heterogeneity in risk aversion. Households with low risk aversion smooth earnings shocks with a small buffer stock of assets, and consequently most of them (optimally) never invest in equities. Therefore, the marginal stockholders are (endogenously) more risk averse, and as a result they do not invest their portfolios fully in stocks.

If households face uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk, theory predicts that redistributive tax and transfer systems have both an insurance and a distortionary effect. Exploiting the substantial variation of tax and transfer systems across U.S. states and over time, we investigate the necessary traces of these two effects in the data: that state-level measures of redistributive taxation should correlate negatively with the standard deviation and the mean of the within-state consumption distribution. We find that the first correlation is robust, supporting strongly the presence of an insurance effect. The distortionary effect can also be detected in the data, but it is less precisely estimated.

Using U.K. microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary annuity market demand. We nd that annuity market participation increases with nancial wealth, life expectancy and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses. We then show that these empirically-motivated determinants of annuity market participation have the same, quantitatively important, eects in a life-cycle model of annuity demand, saving and portfolio choice. Moreover, reasonable preference parameters predict annuity demand levels comparable to the data, thereby questioning the conventional wisdom that limited annuity market participation is a puzzle to be explained.

A large literature emphasizes financial networks, but understanding how these networks influence lending decisions over the business cycle remains challenging. We exploit the overlapping bank portfolio structure of US syndicated loans to construct a financial network. Using techniques from spatial econometrics, we document large spillovers in lending conditions during good times, driven by commonality in banks’ loan portfolio exposures. A standard deviation increase in peers’ lending rates is associated with an increase in a bank’s lending rate of 17 basis points. However, these spillovers vanish in a large recession. We interpret these findings through a syndicate lending model where information spillovers driven by loan portfolio commonality dilute banks’ incentives to produce private information on borrowers during good times.

Rating agencies consult with local government officials several days prior to official announcements of sovereign debt rating changes, making information leakage likely. Using cross-country data from 1988 to 2012, we find evidence of information leakage. In particular, we find statistically and economically significant negative daily abnormal stock index returns prior to downgrade announcements. These effects are more pronounced in countries with lower institutional quality, and they persist during times with no downgrade rumors and no concurrent bad news in general. A mild post-announcement reversal consistent with overreaction to pre-event downgrade rumors highlights the adverse effects of such leakage and, thus, should be a policy concern for capital market regulators.

We show that incorporating defined benefit pension funds in an incomplete markets asset pricing model improves its ability to match the historical equity premium and riskless rate and has important risk‐sharing implications. We document the importance of the pension fund's size and asset demands, and a new risk channel arising from fluctuations in the fund's returns. We use our calibrated model to study the implications of a shift to an economy with defined contribution plans. The new steady state is characterized by a higher riskless rate and a lower equity premium. Consumption volatility increases for retirees but decreases for workers.