Knowledge that Transforms

This paper identifies five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. There are three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity. There are two bond-market factors, related to maturity and default risks. Stock returns have shared variation due to the stock-market factors, and they are linked to bond returns through shared variation in the bond-market factors. Except for low-grade corporates, the bond-market factors capture the common variation in bond returns. Most important, the five factors seem to explain average returns on stocks and bonds.

Several recent papers present signaling models in which firms underprice their initial public offerings of equity (IPOs) so that they can subsequently issue seasoned equity at more favorable prices. We test the implications of these models. We find a positive relation between IPO underpricing and the probability and size of subsequent seasoned offerings. Although these results are consistent with the implications of the signaling hypotheses, the economic significance appears weak. We conduct additional tests to evaluate other explanations for these findings and find the alternatives more compelling.

This paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt. Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. It also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information, although better-than-average borrowers desire information sensitivity. The model implies that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt, and that long-term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt. The model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults.

This paper examines irreversible investment decisions when projects take time to complete and are subject to two types of cost uncertainty. The first is technical uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the physical difficulty of completing a project, which is only resolved as the investment proceeds. The second is input cost uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the prices of construction inputs or over government regulations affecting construction costs, which is external to the firm. These two types of uncertainty have very different effects on the investment decision. A simple investment rule is derived that maximizes firm value, and is used to analyze the decision to start or continue building a nuclear power plant during the 1980s.

This paper examines the price effect of institutional stock trading, using a unique data set that reports the transactions (large and small) of 37 large institutional money management firms. The direction of each trade and the identity of the management firm behind each trade are known. Although institutional trades are associated with some price pressure, we find that the average effect is small. There is also a marked asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells. We relate our findings to various hypotheses on the elasticity of demand for stocks, the cost of executing transactions, and the determinants of market impact. Although market capitalization and relative trade size influence the market impact of a trade, the dominant influence is the identity of the money manager behind the trade.

We examine the proportion of a stock's cumulative price change that occurs in each trade-size category, using transactions data for a sample of NYSE firms. Although the majority of trades are small, most of the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size trades. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category, and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders' private information.

This paper reassesses the apparent systematic underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). Investigation of the distribution of initial returns following IPOs shows that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left (negative) tail. Moreover, most IPOs with zero one-day returns subsequently fall in price, suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial IPO returns, even if offering prices are set at expected market value. This paper thus challenges the presumption underlying previous research that positive average initial IPO returns result primarily from deliberate underpricing.

We examine analysts' earnings forecasts for a sample of takeover targets and document that the announcement-month forecasts are systematically revised upward, supporting the hypothesis that a takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the target firm. In addition, we find that abnormal forecast revisions of future stand-alone earnings are significantly greater for targets with low Tobin's q-ratios relative to targets with high q-ratios, lending further support to the information hypothesis. Finally, we provide evidence that managerial resistance to the takeover does not destroy value. Our results are in direct contrast to Pound (1988).

This paper studies the effects of transaction taxes on the behavior of Swedish equity returns during the 1980–1987 period. Sweden provides an excellent laboratory-style setting for such a study, as taxes were imposed for political purposes rather than to alter the behavior of the stock market. Volatility did not decline in response to the introduction of taxes although stock price levels and turnover did. Large proportions of trading activity migrated overseas to London when the tax rate was increased to 2% in 1986.

This paper analyzes bidding behavior in Mexican Treasury bill auctions for the period 1986–1991. The Mexican auction rules resemble those used in U.S. Treasury bill auctions closely. Results suggest the presence of collusion among large bidders throughout a large portion of the sampling period and the presence of information asymmetries between small and large bidders. Results also suggest that bidders account for the winner's curse and that participants bid more cautiously when uncertainty is high. Bidders' profits fell dramatically in 1990 when the Treasury substituted uniform for discriminatory pricing to combat collusion and to increase auction revenues.