Christopher D. Ittner, David F. Larcker, Are Nonfinancial Measures Leading Indicators of Financial Performance? An Analysis of Customer Satisfaction, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 36, Studies on Enhancing the Financial Reporting Model (1998), pp. 1-35
We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.
Journal of Accounting and Economics200334(1-3), 89-127
The paper examines the determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt employees of “new economy” firms. We find that the determinants of equity grants are significantly different in new versus old economy firms. We also find that employee retention objectives, which new economy firms rank as the most important goal of their equity grant programs, have a significant impact on new hire grants, but not subsequent grants. Our exploratory performance tests indicate that lower than expected grants and/or existing holdings of options are associated with poorer performance in subsequent years.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199519(1), 29-74open access
Using confidential data of executive-specific short-term bonus plans, we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments. As such, this paper extends the work of Healy (1985). Like Healy, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum. Unlike Healy, we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus. We demonstrate that Healy's results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology.
Journal of Accounting and Economics199519(2-3), 279-313open access
We examine whether the structure of compensation for the divisional CEO is related to subsequent innovative activity within the division, and whether the divisional CEO's compensation is structured as a function of the expected innovation opportunity set facing the division. Both the expected innovation opportunity set and the divisional executive's compensation contract are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equation approach. We find modest evidence that the proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive relation with future innovation, but no evidence that this proportion has a positive relation with the expected innovation opportunity set.
This paper provides an analysis of the association between the accounting gain produced by an equity-for-debt swap and executive compensation, Our results suggest that the executives of firms completing a swap transaction experience an Increase in cash compensation (salary plus bonus). The increase is largest both in absolute magnitude and in statistical significance for firms whose compensation plans are more "accounting-oriented" (i.e., firms whose executives would be expected to experience the greatest Increase in compensation under the hypothesis that firm's compensation plan is not adjusted for the accounting gain produced by the swap), We also find that, on average, the value of the executives' personal equity holdings decreases in the period surrounding the announcement of the swap. The magnitude of this decrease is, on average, comparable in size to the increase in their compensation. However, there is some weak evidence that executives of firms whose compensation plans are more "accounting-oriented" experience a statistically significant increase in their total wealth (i.e., the sum of excess compensation and the value of personal equity holdings) as a result of the swap transaction.
Journal of Accounting and Economics201355(2-3), 225-250
Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.