Using a novel data set linking private equity (PE) deals to individual managers, we document evidence of manager skill in terms of generating net present value (NPV), a performance measure that captures both scale and returns. PE firms have strong economic incentives to raise larger funds and execute larger deals. While relative returns decline with scale, NPV persists and even increases. Skilled managers are entrusted with more capital and achieve better career outcomes, and approximately 40% of NPV is attributable to internal capital allocation decisions. These findings highlight the role of PE firms in creating value through performance‐based capital deployment.

The deposit franchise is valuable because banks pay below‐market deposit rates. However, if depositors leave, its value vanishes. This can trigger runs by uninsured depositors, even if banks hold fully liquid assets. Because the franchise value increases with interest rates, runs are more harmful, and hence likelier, when rates are high. Banks can deter runs by shortening asset duration, but this risks insolvency if rates fall. Avoiding both runs and insolvency requires capital covering the potential loss of the uninsured deposit franchise. We estimate deposit franchise values and use them to identify vulnerable banks during the 2023 regional bank crisis.

This paper provides novel empirical evidence that cash‐rich firms have higher equity payouts and higher stock prices in response to expansionary monetary policy surprises. Stock prices rise despite weak cash‐flow, investment, and credit responses to monetary policy. I rationalize the empirical evidence in a heterogeneous‐firm New Keynesian model where firms finance investment with cash and equity issuance. Monetary easing weakens precautionary cash demand, leading cash‐rich firms to optimally allocate excess funds to shareholders. Since payouts are procyclical, cash‐rich firms earn higher returns in expansionary periods. My findings highlight a payout channel through which monetary policy impacts asset prices.

We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon.