A large body of literature estimates private returns to R&D adopting the Griliches knowledge production framework, which ignores the potential impact of spillovers on consistent estimation. Using a panel of twelve manufacturing industries across ten OECD economies, we investigate whether ignoring spillovers leads to bias in the estimated private returns to R&D. We compare results from a common factor framework, which accounts for spillovers and other unobserved shocks, to those from a standard Griliches approach. Our findings confirm that conventional estimates conflate own-R&D and spillover effects, implying that spillovers cannot be ignored even when the interest lies exclusively in evaluating private returns to R&D.

We survey the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the choice of intellectual property protection by firms. Our focus is on the trade-offs between using patents and disclosing versus the use of secrecy, although we also look briefly at the use of other means of formal intellectual property protection.

We examine the effect of board interlocks on patenting and R&D spending for publicly traded companies in India. We exploit a corporate governance reform to address the endogeneity of board interlocks through exogenous changes mandated by the reform requiring a subset of firms to adjust their board structure. We rely on two difference-in-differences frameworks, comparing firms affected by the reform to unaffected firms as well as comparing within the set of firms that did not have to adjust their board structure those that still experienced an exogenous increase of their network size as a result of the reform to those that did not experience a change in their network size. We find that board interlocks have significant positive effects on both R&D and patenting. The evidence suggests that the impact on R&D is induced by information transmission through interlocks. The effect on patenting is driven by firms extending patent protection by patenting inventions abroad that they have already patented in India.

This study examines how the ownership structure of corporations shapes their responses to discontinuous technological change. We analyze whether mixed ownership, a situation where following privatization a company's shares are held both privately and by the government, is associated with less innovation in response to discontinuous technological change. We argue that mixed ownership is associated with governance conflicts that affect a company's ability to respond to the challenges posed by discontinuous technological change. Our empirical analysis uses data on European telecommunications operators for the period 2000–2016 when they faced sweeping technological change due to the advent of Internet-based communication services. Our baseline result suggests that operators with mixed ownership file around 70% fewer patents in relevant digital technologies than companies that are fully private or where the government owns a majority of shares. We find that mixed ownership also affects negatively the acquisition of externally developed technology.