Inside traders are well-documented to leverage private idiosyncratic information for personal gain in centralized exchanges such as stock markets. Evidence is rare, however, for decentralized and fragmented over-the-counter markets with microstructure properties that make them particularly vulnerable to stealth trading. The 2015 criminal conviction of Hill and Kamay for foreign exchange insider trading is the first in over-the-counter markets. We analyze their actions to show the complex, strategic decision-making of insiders even in opaque markets where they run a low risk of detection and prosecution: they trade when the market is most sensitive to local information, carefully choose and time their trades to minimize the risk of confounding information disclosures that may affect their profits, as well as act during high noise trading to mask their trades. Our results are consistent with evidence on insider trading in stock markets. We highlight the limitations of regulatory control in over-the-counter markets where technology-based surveillance methods are ineffective, while reinforcing the importance of whistleblowers in detecting and preventing insider trading.

We study share repurchase announcements for nine European countries between 2000 and 2017. In contrast to previous studies, we address the role of market uncertainty as a market-based determinant of positive average abnormal announcement returns, while including governance, liquidity risk and firm related control variables. Economic policy uncertainty and financial uncertainty, individually as well as jointly, positively affect abnormal returns. We suggest that this relation is due to a stronger signaling effect under increased uncertainty, as both information asymmetry and underpricing tend to increase. Also, a potential hedge against adverse market movements is more valuable. Optimal timing of repurchase announcements should therefore consider market uncertainty conditions.

Internationalization enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to diversify their sources and types of debt, as well as earnings, although doing so can negatively impact firm risk and the agency costs of debt. Utilizing a primary sample of United States (US) based MNCs compared with domestic corporations (DCs), we find that MNCs are indeed riskier than DCs when considering systematic risk. Further, recognizing the heterogeneity of long-term debt, we find these MNCs consistently maintain a higher convertible debt ratio compared to DCs. We argue this is to mitigate the agency costs related to the asset substitution problem.

We examine the influence of both organizational and geographical religiosity, as important ethical parameters moderating a bank’s decision to securitize their assets. The study employs a unique database of banks located within countries marked by high (low) religious adherence. Our results provide evidence that different measures of religiosity affect a bank’s decision to securitize their assets: Banks located in countries with high religious adherence are less likely to engage with securitization compared to banks in countries with lower religiosity, while Islamic banks have a higher likelihood of embarking on a highly monitored model of asset securitization in contrast to conventional banks. When examining the motives underlying a bank’s decision to securitize assets, there is strong evidence that Islamic banks securitize their assets to improve their portfolio diversification, financial performance, and regulatory compliance. This study highlights the importance of considering informal ethical mechanisms, such as religiosity, at both the country and firm levels, when studying bank risk-taking and trading decisions, especially in countries with dual banking systems.

This study examines the impact of foreign controlling shareholder trust on firm market risk using two measures of total and idiosyncratic risk. An extensive global sample of 12,496 firm-year observations from 43 countries is employed. The results show that firms controlled by foreign trusting shareholders display lower levels of risk in both market measures. Trust appears more important for firms based in countries with a less favourable institutional environment, whereby it varies with the investment horizon of foreign controlling shareholders. The results are robust after controlling for cultural measures, endogeneity, selection bias and alternate model specifications.