Although q2 measures how well a pattern of means fits a custom contrast, there is no guidance for what values are “good.” We survey experimental accounting researchers who assess the fit between plots of means and contrast weights as poor, acceptable, good, or excellent. We find that graphical presentation effects and researchers’ individual attributes influence their assessments. This suggests that research needs an ex ante method for evaluating q2, grounded empirically in the wisdom of the crowd across many different presentations, rather than relying solely on the idiosyncratic assessments of individual researchers. Using fuzzy set theory, we develop such a method that researchers can use to characterize q2 = 0.100, for example, as mostly good fit, leaning toward acceptable. Our approach has significant advantages over bright-line cutoffs commonly used for other statistical indices. Overall, our study can improve our discipline’s assessments of fit between experimental results and custom contrast weights. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

During the interactive process of issue resolution, client managers may develop expectations about the auditor’s position. We examine the effect that negative expectancy violations have on managers’ pre-negotiation positions and how relational familiarity can moderate this effect. Through a series of experiments, we find that, when the partner’s proposed adjustment is within the client’s original expectations, managers offer greater concessions to a more familiar partner than to a less familiar partner. However, depending on relational familiarity, client managers react to expectancy violations very differently. Managers react more severely when a more familiar partner violates expectations, offering lower negotiation concessions than when no violation occurs. In contrast, managers tend to ignore violations committed by a less familiar partner, offering similar negotiation concessions whether or not a violation has occurred. Furthermore, we find support for a practical intervention to repair damage from expectancy violations committed by more familiar partners.

National office consultations (NOCs) are a mechanism intended to enhance audit quality, consistent with the logic of professionalism inherent in the audit profession. Yet research indicates that the competing logic of commercialism has become institutionalized in audit firms. We examine how the coexisting and conflicting logics of professionalism and commercialism manifest themselves in the current NOC dynamic. Specifically, we interview 22 highly experienced Big 4 audit firm partners to investigate how key actors engage in institutional work that creates, maintains, and disrupts the influence of professionalism and commercialism in NOC practices. We observe a swing of the pendulum: in the wake of SOX, audit firms adopted professionalism‐based practices which involved creating a more authoritative, “Oz”‐like national office identity, while in recent years key actors' institutional work reconfigured NOC practices and placed a renewed focus on commercialism. Our findings bring to light a number of implications that offer opportunities for future research. Although the new client‐inclusive culture aims to improve audit outcomes by encouraging consultations and fostering open dialogue with clients, it also exposes the national office to relationship‐management pressures and client‐service demands. Thus, practices developed to uphold professionalism also created a channel for commercialism‐focused practices, leading to unintended second‐order effects.

While current audit standards explicitly state engagement partner tenure requirements, firms have flexibility in managing the rotation process. We conduct semi-structured interviews with 20 U.S. audit firm partners who share their experiences on topics including how they identify appropriate candidate partners and what efforts they undertake to manage relationships with clients post-rotation. We investigate firms' motivation to manage the auditor-client relationship through the lens of Social Exchange Theory (SET), and we consider how likely outcomes of this rotation process map onto regulators' intent that a newly rotated partner provides a fresh perspective to the audit. Our study informs regulators and investors about the process by which engagement partners are selected for rotation, documenting that partner assignment is typically not random. Further, our finding that partner rotation is an extended process (rather than a single discrete event) has implications for audit researchers investigating the effects of partner rotation.