In this article, I propose and estimate a dynamic model of education, borrowing, and work decisions of high school graduates. I examine the effect of relaxing borrowing constraints on educational attainment by simulating increases in the amount students are permitted to borrow from government-sponsored loan programs. My results indicate that borrowing constraints have a small impact on attainment: the removal of education-related borrowing constraints raises bachelor’s degree completion by 2.4 percentage points. Tuition subsidies are necessary to obtain larger increases: I find that higher subsidies for average-ability students are the most cost effective targeted tuition subsidies.

Publicizing firms’ socially undesirable actions may enhance firms’ incentives to avoid such actions. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) began issuing press releases about facilities that violated safety and health regulations. Using quasi-random variation arising from a cutoff rule OSHA followed, I find that publicizing a facility’s violations led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance and experience fewer occupational injuries. OSHA would need to conduct 210 additional inspections to achieve the same improvement in compliance as achieved with a single press release. Evidence suggests that employers improve compliance to avoid costly responses from workers. (JEL J28, J81, K32, L51, M54)

The long-term decline in US workers’ attempts to organize labor unions accelerated after 2000. We find that the swift rise of imports from China arising from a change in trade policy accounts for nearly all of this post-2000 acceleration: union certification elections decreased substantially among workers in manufacturing industries directly exposed to imports, but also among workers indirectly exposed through their local labor market. Consistent with a simple model of workers’ decision to seek union representation, direct exposure lowered the expected wage gain from unionization, whereas indirect exposure increased the cost of job loss—both of which discourage organizing.

We develop an equilibrium model of the US labor market, fit to Panel Study of Income Dynamics data from 1968–96. Our main innovation is a finer differentiation of types of labor than in prior work (i.e., by occupation, education, gender, and age). This lets us fit wage and employment patterns better than simpler models. We obtain a good fit to wages and occupational choices over the 29-year period while also explaining college attendance rates. We use the model to assess factors driving changes in the wage structure. Occupational demand shifts and shifts in demand for college labor and female labor within occupations are key factors.

We investigate how demand conditions affect employers’ provision of safety—something about which theory is ambivalent. Positive demand shocks relax financial constraints that limit safety investment but simultaneously raise the opportunity cost of increasing safety rather than production. We study the US metals mining sector, leveraging exogenous demand shocks from short-term variation in global commodity prices. We find that positive price shocks substantially increase workplace injury rates and safety regulation noncompliance. While these results indicate the general dominance of the opportunity cost effect, shocks that only increase mines’ cash flow lower injury rates, illustrating that financial constraints also affect safety.

Workplace safety policies are designed to ensure that employers internalize the costs of injuries, but employers can undermine these policies with threats of dismissal. We show that states’ adoption of the public policy exception to at-will employment—an exception forbidding employers from firing workers for filing workers’ compensation claims or for whistleblowing—led to a substantial reduction in injuries. The widespread adoption of the public policy exception explains 14% of the decline in fatal injury rates between 1979 and 1994. Statutory protections from retaliatory firing also improved safety, but only when employers faced sufficiently strong penalties for violating them.

We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers? earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are far-reaching: increasing enforceability imposes externalities on workers across state borders, suggesting broad effects on labor market dynamism. We show that enforceability affects wages by reducing outside options and preventing workers from leveraging tight labor markets to increase earnings. We motivate these findings with a model of search and bargaining. Finally, higher NCA enforceability exacerbates gender and racial earnings gaps.