This paper studies how the risk of hold‐up affects procurement. I use data on the universe of solar power auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of counterparty risk, because solar plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions intermediated by either risky states themselves or the trusted central government. I find that the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar prices by 10%. This risk premium sharply reduces investment, because demand for green energy is elastic. Contract intermediation by the central government eliminates the counterparty risk premium.

Weak contract enforcement may reduce the efficiency of production in developing countries. I study how contract enforcement affects efficiency in procurement auctions for the largest power projects in India. I gather data on bidding and ex post contract renegotiation and find that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that bidders are allowed to index their bids to future costs like the price of coal. To study heterogeneity in bidding strategies, I construct a new measure of firm connectedness, based on whether a firm has been awarded coal concessions by the Government. Connected firms choose to index less of the value of their bids to coal prices and, through this strategy, expose themselves to cost shocks to induce renegotiation. I use a structural model of bidding in a scoring auction to characterize equilibrium bidding when bidders are heterogeneous both in cost and in the payments they expect after renegotiation. The model estimates show that bidders offer power below cost due to the expected value of later renegotiation. The model is used to simulate bidding and efficiency with strict contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro‐competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise to cover cost, but markups relative to total contract value fall sharply. Production costs decline, due to projects being allocated to lower‐cost bidders over those who expect larger payments in renegotiation.

Abstract We study rainmaking as an instrumental religious belief. We present a model in which a religious leader tries to persuade people to believe. Praying for rain can persuade only where the hazard of rainfall during a dry spell is increasing over time, so that prayer is most likely to succeed when people most want rain. We present evidence from prayers for rain in Murcia, Spain, where the hazard rate is increasing, that the church’s prayers for rain predict rainfall over two centuries. To generalize this finding, we gather an original data set of whether ethnic groups around the world traditionally prayed for rain. We find that ethnic groups facing an increasing rainfall hazard are 47% more likely to pray for rain, consistent with our model’s prediction that societies are more likely to pray for rain where prayer is persuasive.

Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers, lowering productivity. Pigouvian reform would increase agricultural surplus by 12% of household income yet fall well short of a Pareto improvement over rationing.

ABSTRACT We examine heterogeneity in depositor responses to solvency risk using depositor‐level data for a bank that faced two different runs. We find that depositors with loans and bank staff are less likely to run than others during a low‐solvency‐risk shock, but are more likely to run during a high‐solvency‐risk shock. Uninsured depositors are also sensitive to bank solvency. In contrast, depositors with older accounts run less, and those with frequent past transactions run more, irrespective of the underlying risk. Our results show that the fragility of a bank depends on the composition of its deposit base.

Abstract In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically higher. Second, the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards. Third, treatment plants, in turn, reduced their pollution emissions. The results suggest reformed incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective.

High pollution persists in many developing countries despite strict environmental rules. We use a field experiment and a structural model to study how plant emission standards are enforced. In collaboration with an Indian environmental regulator, we experimentally doubled the rate of inspection for treatment plants and required that the extra inspections be assigned randomly. We find that treatment plants only slightly increased compliance. We hypothesize that this weak effect is due to poor targeting, since the random inspections in the treatment found fewer extreme violators than the regulator's own discretionary inspections. To unbundle the roles of extra inspections and the removal of discretion over what plants to target, we set out a model of environmental regulation where the regulator targets inspections, based on a signal of pollution, to maximize plant abatement. Using the experiment to identify key parameters of the model, we find that the regulator aggressively targets its discretionary inspections, to the degree that half of the plants receive fewer than one inspection per year, while plants expected to be the dirtiest may receive ten. Counterfactual simulations show that discretion in targeting helps enforcement: inspections that the regulator assigns cause three times more abatement than would the same number of randomly assigned inspections. Nonetheless, we find that the regulator's information on plant pollution is poor, and improvements in monitoring would reduce emissions.

We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator.

Abstract Market-based environmental regulations are seldom used in low-income countries, where pollution is highest but state capacity is often low. We collaborated with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) to design and experimentally evaluate the world’s first particulate-matter emissions market, which covered industrial plants in a large Indian city. There are three main findings. First, the market functioned well. Treatment plants, randomly assigned to the emissions market, traded permits to become significant net sellers or buyers. After trading, treatment plants held enough permits to cover their emissions 99% of the time, compared with just 66% compliance with standards under the command-and-control status quo. Second, treatment plants reduced pollution emissions, relative to control plants, by 20%–30%. Third, the market reduced abatement costs by an estimated 11%, holding constant emissions. This cost-savings estimate is based on plant-specific marginal cost curves that we estimate from the universe of bids to buy and sell permits in the market. The combination of pollution reductions and low costs imply that the emissions market has mortality benefits that exceed its costs by at least 25 times.