We analyze the removal of the credit-risk guarantees provided by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in a model with agents heterogeneous in income and house price risk. We find that wealth inequality increases, driven by higher mortgage spreads and housing rents. Housing holdings become more concentrated. Foreclosures fall. The removal benefits high-income households, while hurting low-and mid-income households (renters and highly leveraged mortgagors with conforming loans). GSE reform requires compensating transfers, sufficiently high elasticity of rental supply, or linking GSE reform with the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction.

Abstract We show that mortgage recourse systems, by discouraging default, magnify the impact of nominal rigidities. They cause deeper and more persistent recessions. This mechanism can account for up to 31% of the recovery gap during the Great Recession between the U.S., mostly a non-recourse economy, and Spain, a recourse economy. General equilibrium effects explain most of the differences between mortgage systems. With recourse, highly indebted homeowners dramatically cut consumption in a crisis, and account for a larger share of the aggregate consumption decline. However, without recourse, mortgages would be more expensive for riskier households, and homeownership rates would be lower.

Abstract We show how securitization affects the size of the nonbank lending sector through a novel price-based channel. We identify the channel using a regulatory spillover shock to the cross-section of mortgage-backed security prices: the U.S. liquidity coverage ratio. The shock increases secondary market prices for FHA-insured loans by granting them favorable regulatory status once securitized. Higher prices lower nonbanks’ funding costs, prompting them to loosen lending standards and originate more FHA-insured loans. This channel accounts for 22% of nonbanks’ growth in overall mortgage market share over 2013–2015. While the shock creates risks for financial stability, homeownership also increases.

We analyze the removal of the credit-risk guarantees provided by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in a model with agents heterogeneous in income and house price risk. We find that wealth inequality increases, driven by higher mortgage spreads and housing rents. Housing holdings become more concentrated. Foreclosures fall. The removal benefits high-income households, while hurting low- and mid-income households (renters and highly leveraged mortgagors with conforming loans). GSE reform requires compensating transfers, sufficiently high elasticity of rental supply, or linking GSE reform with the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction. Received March 11, 2016; editorial decision May 5, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

We show that a contraction of mortgage supply after the Great Recession has increased housing rents. Our empirical strategy exploits heterogeneity in MSAs' exposure to regulatory shocks experienced by lenders over the 2010-2014 period. Tighter lending standards have increased demand for rental housing and have led to higher rents, depressed homeownership rates and an increase in rental supply. Absent the credit supply contraction, annual rent growth would have been 2.1 percentage points lower over 2010-2014 in MSAs where lending standards rose from their 2008 levels.

This paper analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking in a model with fire sales externalities. When these externalities are not internalized by a bank's shareholders and executives, borrowing and fire sales are higher than the socially optimal level. Our analysis shows that plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities. Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits can restore social efficiency. Bail-in bonds can achieve efficiency at a smaller cost since they allow for state-contingent payments. It is not the level but the composition of variable compensation that determines the inefficiency. Excessive regulation may lead to suboptimal levels of risk-taking. Government guarantees reinforce the fire sales externalities and the need for regulation.

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.