Knowledge that Transforms

Firms increasingly borrow via sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), contractually tying spreads to their ESG performance. SLLs vary widely in transparency of disclosure regarding sustainability-related contract details and tend to be issued to borrowers with superior ESG profiles. While high-transparency SLL borrowers maintain this performance, low-transparency SLL borrowers exhibit significantly deteriorating ESG performance after issuance. Both high- and low-transparency borrowers pay substantial fees to obtain SLLs. The results are consistent with high-transparency borrowers using SLLs to “certify” their preexisting ESG commitments, but low-transparency borrowers “greenwashing” with empty SLL labels. Evidence on drawdowns, renegotiations, and stock market reactions further supports these interpretations.

This paper provides empirical evidence of a well-known theoretical concern that market failures in two-sided markets are hard to identify and correct. We study the reactions of banks, merchants, and consumers to Dodd-Frank’s Durbin Amendment that lowered interchange fees on debit card transactions. Banks recouped a significant portion of their losses by charging consumers for products that they previously provided for free on the subsidized side of the two-sided market. The accelerated adoption of credit cards with higher interchange fees likely diminished—if not eliminated—merchants’ savings. These effects impede the regulation’s stated objective of enhancing consumers’ welfare through lower retail prices.

Using more than 4900 personality assessments, we study changes in the characteristics of CEOs and top executives since 2001. The same four factors explain roughly half of the variation in executive characteristics in this larger sample of assessments as in Kaplan and Sorensen (2021). In later years, CEO candidates have shown declining general ability, are increasingly execution-oriented, less interpersonal, less charismatic, and less creative-strategic, and many of these differences persist for hired CEOs. We find no evidence of increasing prevalence or importance of interpersonal and softer skills. Executives assessed for the same company have positively correlated abilities, suggesting that high-ability executives complement each other. Finally, we consider corporate objectives and CEO characteristics.

We develop a market-based methodology to assess banks’ resilience to climate-related risks and study the climate-related risk exposure of large global banks. We introduce a new measure, CRISK, which is the expected capital shortfall of a bank in a climate stress scenario. To estimate CRISK, we construct climate risk factors and dynamically measure banks’ stock return sensitivity (that is, climate beta) to the climate risk factor. We validate the climate risk factor empirically and the climate beta estimates by using granular data on large US banks’ loan portfolios. The measure is useful in quantifying banks’ climate-related risk exposure through the market risk and the credit risk channels.

UK government bond yields tend to drift upwards before scheduled news such as monetary policy announcements and labour market data releases. This effect is particularly pronounced during periods of UK bond issuance and is linked to higher term premia. Financial intermediary constraints play a role as dealers avoid accumulating inventory in pre-news windows following issuance. The composition of liquidity providers also shifts: hedge funds buy a large share of the bond issuance outside pre-news windows, but more passive investors – such as foreign central banks and pension funds – provide liquidity in pre-news windows. We outline a simple model to rationalize these findings.

We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.

We show that financial constraints lead to spatial misallocation and contribute to racial disparities in housing and wealth accumulation. Using bunching and difference-in-differences designs, we document that down payment constraints disproportionately limit the ability of Black households to access housing in high-opportunity areas. We build a dynamic life-cycle model to examine the long-term wealth effects of these leverage distortions on group differences in wealth accumulation. Black households are more affected by financial and spatial frictions, limiting wealth building opportunities. Improving mortgage access and housing supply in high-opportunity areas helps reduce racial wealth disparities, emphasizing the need for access to geographic opportunities rather than homeownership alone.

I show that prices impact analyst cash flow expectations and argue this impact can partially reconcile subjective beliefs data with asset pricing models in which investors have rational expectations and discount rate variation drives prices. Previous work argues that correlations of biased analyst cash flow expectations with prices and future returns contradict rational models and imply biased investor expectations distort prices. However, using two instrumental variables for price, I find increases in price unrelated to cash flow news raise analyst cash flow expectations. Based on this empirical finding, I propose a model with rational investors that matches key moments in beliefs data: analysts form biased cash flow expectations by learning from prices that contain discount rate variation. Thus, while stylized facts in beliefs data can be consistent with investors having biased expectations that distort prices, these facts can also be consistent with investors having rational expectations and analysts learning from prices.

We explore the extent to which aspirations – such as those forged in the course of social interactions – explain ‘puzzling’ behavioral patterns in investment decisions. We motivate an aspirational utility, reminiscent of Friedman and Savage (1948), where social considerations (e.g., status concerns) provide an economic foundation for aspirations. We show this utility can explain a range of observed investor behaviors, such as the demand for both right- and left-skewed assets; aspects of the disposition effect; and patterns in stock-market participation consistent with empirical observations. We corroborate our theoretical findings with two novel laboratory experimental studies, where we observed participants’ preference for skewness in risky lotteries shift as lab-induced aspirations shifted.

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important mechanism through which technology is adopted by firms. Firms with greater technological skill acquire less tech-savvy firms and, subsequently, increase technology investment at the target. This has important implications for labor reallocation following M&As. We show that target establishments become less routine intensive post-M&A, especially when a target had greater routine occupational employment, compared to its acquirer, ex-ante. We also provide evidence consistent with targets investing in information technology which tends to displace more office routine occupations. Such labor reallocation impacts wages, resulting in higher pay inequality within target establishments.