Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We develop a dynamic capital structure model to study how agency conflicts between managers and shareholders affect the joint determination of financing and investment decisions. We show that there are two agency conflicts with opposing effects on a manager’s choice of investment: first, the consumption of private benefits channel leads managers not only to choose a lower optimal leverage, but also to underinvest, and second, compensation linked to firm size may lead managers to overinvest. We fit the model to the data and show that the average firm slightly overinvests, younger CEOs invest more than older ones, while CEOs with longer tenure overinvest more than CEOs with shorter tenure. (JEL G12, G31, G32)

Abstract We study U.S. banks’ payout policy in 2007–2008. We benchmark these payouts against payouts before the crisis, measure stock price reactions to announcements of dividend changes, and analyze changes in the relation between payout growth and future performance. Further, we examine cross-sectional variation in banks’ payout policy to gauge the possible motives underlying banks’ payout decisions in 2007–2008. We do not find that banks that have a higher willingness to take risk or that have higher incentives to undertake asset substitution use their payout policy to engage in more wealth transfer compared to other banks. (JEL G21, G24, G28, G32, G35). Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We document novel evidence on the spillover effect of a corporate control regulation on local mortgage markets. We find that banks directly targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to rectify their internal control weaknesses reduce mortgage originations following the regulation’s enactment. This causes mortgage credit to be reallocated toward other banks in the same local markets: while competing public banks expand lending to safer borrowers, private banks increase lending toward risky applicants. Consequently, loans originated by private banks in spillover counties report higher default rates. (JEL E51, G21, G38)

Abstract The U.S. banking sector had nearly 70% fewer banks in 2022 relative to 1989, primarily because of mergers. We develop a methodology to estimate cross-market spillover effects of bank mergers and test whether the operations of incumbents facing consolidating competitors in one market are affected in other markets. We find that nonmerging banks within a market that are one standard deviation more exposed to mergers in other markets increase deposits by 2.1% relative to their less exposed competitors. Our methodology may be applied elsewhere to assess the aggregate impacts of industry consolidation and illustrates challenges with product-based or geographic market definitions.

Abstract We demonstrate a novel link between skilled immigration restrictions, corporate innovation, and industry consolidation. Binding restrictions on H1B visas are a shock to firms’ R&D labor supply, leading firms to shift R&D expenditures and employees overseas. Organizationally and financially constrained firms are less able to adjust to the restrictions. They reduce basic research and patenting, are less able to acquire other firms for intellectual property, and are more likely to exit. Industry concentration and firm-level markups increase when firms are better able to adjust. This increase in market power is an unintended consequence of skilled immigration restrictions.

Abstract Despite its large and increasing size in the United States and Europe, the private debt (PD) market, compared to the bank and syndicated loan markets, has been researched little. In this paper, we survey U.S. and European investors with private debt assets under management (AuM) of over $390 billion. These investors are primarily direct lending funds. We ask the general partners (GPs) how they source, select, and evaluate deals; how they think of private debt relative to bank and syndicated loan financing; how they monitor their investments; how they interact with private equity (PE) sponsors; and how they view the future of the market. Respondents provide primarily cash-flow-based loans and believe that they finance companies and leverage levels that banks would not fund. Direct lending funds target unlevered returns that appear high relative to their risk. They use leverage in their funds, but appreciably less than banks and collateralized loan obligation funds (CLOs). They use and negotiate for both financial and negative covenants to monitor their investments. The presence of PE sponsors helps them lend more and craft more effective covenants. U.S. and European funds are similar along many dimensions, but European funds rely less on PE sponsors and compete more with banks. Overall, the private debt market is both different from and shares characteristics with bank loan and syndicated loan markets. (JEL G23, G30, G32)

Abstract Institutional investors can be segmented into investors that hold simple portfolios of traditional equities and bonds, and investors that manage complex strategies in public and private markets. Investors implementing active portfolio management and holding diversified portfolios of equities and bonds are more likely to invest in alternative asset classes. The performance of institutional investors in alternative assets is significantly lower than in equities, suggesting that investors accept lower returns in exchange for diversification benefits. Institutions delegate 90% of their alternative investments to external managers and funds-of-funds. These intermediaries capture large part of the potential diversification benefits through higher fees and lower returns. (JEL G11, G23) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Increases in government debt are associated with a reduction in the yield spread between high-grade corporate bonds and long-term Treasuries and an increase in fiscal uncertainty. Consequently, increases in government debt significantly reduce the firm’s likelihood of acquisition. The effect is stronger among firms whose debt is a closer substitute for Treasuries and firms with greater exposure to fiscal uncertainty. A positive change in government debt motivates acquirers to avoid cash financing or more irreversible deals. The average deal quality is lower during periods of rising public debt, consistent with heightened fiscal uncertainty impeding monitoring and fostering “bad” deals. (JEL D80, E22, E62, G18, G34, G38).

Abstract Using hand-collected data on financial asset portfolios and exploiting the 2014 oil price crisis as an exogenous cash flow shock, we investigate financial risk-taking at distressed firms. We find that distressed firms, with high debt rollover risk proxied for by short-term liabilities, substantially increase their investments in risky financial assets, including corporate debt, equity, and mortgage-backed securities. The effects are stronger for unhedged firms with low collateral assets. Overall, we provide new evidence that distressed firms take risk using financial assets camouflaged as cash reserves, which, compared to real assets, are less visible and carry lower transaction costs and accelerated payoffs. (JEL G32, G34)

Abstract Firm structure affects incentives and performance. We document significant differences in subprime lending between banks and credit unions prior to and during the Great Recession. In 2006, 23.6% of mortgages from commercial banks were subprime versus only 3.6% of mortgages from credit unions. Moreover, banks were more likely to fail, and had higher delinquency and net charge-off ratios immediately following the financial crisis. Our empirical models control for important differences between credit unions and banks including firm-level characteristics, borrower-level characteristics, and state-level economic conditions. We argue that the remaining difference captures the effects of credit unions’ nonprofit and cooperative structure, which encourages them to internalize the utility of their customer-owners. Our findings explain why credit unions often appear more risk averse relative to commercial banks, a result with important research and policy implications. (JEL G12, G31)