Knowledge that Transforms

Anti-recharacterization laws significantly increase the rights of securitization creditors by allowing the buyers of securitized assets to exclusively and immediately seize collateral in bankruptcy. However, strengthening the rights of securitization creditors can limit other creditors’ ability to recover loans. We find that, after a state adopts an anti-recharacterization law, local banks operating in the same state accrue more loan loss provisions, tighten their loan contracts, and incur higher future loan charge-offs. These findings are consistent with the argument that a safe harbor for securitization transactions advantages Wall Street-style structured finance at the expense of Main Street-style lending.

Digital platforms reduce geographic frictions, enabling better matching between service providers and users. I quantify reallocation gains in Swedish online health care, using nationwide time-conditional random assignment between patients and physicians. Matching high-risk patients with doctors effective at reducing Emergency Room visits lowers such visits by 4.4 percent (SE 1.3); reallocations also reduce Counter-Guideline antibiotics by 3.1 percent (1.4). I find limited trade-offs in matching; horizontal differentiation among doctors and varied patient needs allow improvement in multiple outcomes simultaneously. Efficiency-enhancing reallocations also affect equity. The findings highlight the potential for care reorganization aligning provider heterogeneity with patient needs when geographic constraints are lifted.

We study the effects of the largest corporate income tax cut in U.S. history on firms and workers. To identify causal effects, we use employer-employee matched tax records and event studies comparing similarly sized firms in the same industry that faced divergent tax changes due to their pre-existing legal status. Tax cuts cause increases in firms' investment, sales, profits, employment, and payrolls, with earnings gains concentrated among highly paid workers. In the short-run, 87% of private income gains flow to the top 10% of the income distribution.

Designing public transport networks involves trade-offs between coverage, service frequency, and direct service. We use the expansion of the bus system in Jakarta, Indonesia, to study these trade-offs. We analyze how new direct connections, changes in bus travel time, and wait-time reductions affect bus ridership and aggregate flows and estimate a transit network demand model by matching the route launch events. Commuters in Jakarta are 2–3 times more sensitive to wait time than bus time and inattentive to long routes. We develop a flexible framework to characterize optimal networks. A less concentrated network would increase ridership and commuter welfare.

This paper studies how municipal governments jointly manage spending, credit market borrowing, and a public employee pension system. I model governments as levered investors who must meet non-defaultable pension obligations and may value government spending more than citizens. I quantify the model using data on California cities, including a new record of fiscal emergencies, tax increases required to maintain essential city services. After the financial crisis depleted pension funds, cities engaged in excessive risk-taking: the fiscal emergency option encouraged gambling for resurrection that kept cities vulnerable to shocks well into the recovery. To correct this problem, a savings requirement works better than a restriction on risk-taking or a pension funding requirement. The policy experiments emphasize that effective policies need to target the combined pension and bond finances, as policies that only target one, such as a pension funding requirement, are undermined by endogenous changes to the other.

Annuities, long‐term care insurance, and reverse mortgages remain puzzlingly unpopular to manage post‐retirement longevity, health, and housing price risks. We use a flexible life‐cycle model structurally estimated with a unique stated‐preference survey experiment of Canadian households to understand why. Key factors include high risk aversion, concern over long‐run risks, strong discounting of valuation in disability states, imperfect housing substitutability, and bequest motives. The remaining disinterest is accounted for by information frictions and inertia. We also document evidence of public insurance crowding out, spousal co‐insurance, and responsiveness to product bundling.

The PCAOB posits that audit partner and manager involvement, primarily through greater supervision and review (“oversight”) of audit engagements, is an important determinant and indicator of audit quality. We test this notion by empirically examining the link between staffing leverage, as measured by an office's ratio of audit partners and managers to audit employees, and audit outcomes from 2008 to 2022. We find staffing leverage is associated with lower rates of client misstatements, comment letters, and PCAOB inspection deficiencies, suggesting higher audit quality. When disaggregated, the association pertains to both partners and nonpartner managers. This relation is stronger for more complex clients and for offices with better management. We also find that staffing leverage measured at the firm level predicts audit quality, and that both office‐ and firm‐level staffing leverage are incrementally informative of audit quality, suggesting disclosing audit oversight metrics at multiple levels could be beneficial. However, the association between firm‐level staffing leverage and audit quality is statistically detected only within Big 4 audits. These findings suggest that audit committees, investors, and regulators can use audit‐office partner‐staffing and manager‐staffing leverage as an informative indicator of audit quality, particularly for complex engagements.