To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
19 results

Inside debt, bank default risk, and performance during the crisis

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2015 24(4), 487-513
In this paper, we examine whether the structure of the chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation package can explain default risk and performance in bank holding companies (BHCs) during the recent credit crisis. Using a sample of 371 BHCs, we show that in 2006 higher holdings of inside debt relative to inside equity by a CEO after controlling for firm leverage is associated with lower default risk and better performance during the crisis period. We present evidence that before the crisis banks with higher inside debt ratios also have supervisory ratings that indicate stronger capital positions, better management, stronger earnings, and being in a better position to withstand market shocks in the future. Such ex-ante evidence can explain the observed relationship between inside debt, default risk, and performance during the crisis.

Hedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions

Journal of Finance 1998 53(3), 979-1013
We provide an explanation for hedging as a means of allocating rather than reducing risk. We argue that when increases in total risk are costly, firms optimally allocate risk by reducing (increasing) exposure to risks that provide zero (positive) economic rents. Our evidence shows that mutual thrifts that convert to stock institutions increase total risk following conversion, consistent with their increased abilities and incentives for risk taking. They achieve this increase by hedging interest‐rate risk and increasing credit risk. We provide some evidence that risk‐management activities are related to growth capacity and management compensation structure attained at conversion.

Issue Size Choice and “Underpricing” in Thrift Mutual‐to‐Stock Conversions

Journal of Finance 1993 48(5), 1659-1692
Issue size choice and underpricing in mutual‐to‐stock conversions of thrifts are explained as a function of growth opportunities, perquisite consumption, and proprietary information. We provide evidence that thrifts with greater growth opportunities choose larger issue size and experience higher after‐market price appreciation. This finding persists when we allow for investors' inferences about managers' proprietary information. Variables that explain underpricing in typical initial public offerings are significant by themselves but lose significance when combined with the issue size choice variables. Managerial holdings and the offer price do not act as dissipative signals of value in thrift conversions.

The regulatory dialectic in bank-sponsored money market funds

Journal of Financial Stability 2025 80, 101454
The regulatory dialectic describes the dynamic process of banks and regulators continuously acting and reacting to one another. We provide empirical evidence of the regulatory dialectic in the prime institutional money market fund (PI-MMF) industry. Regulations on commercial deposits fueled growth in bank-sponsored PI-MMFs as a form of shadow banking in a relatively less regulated market. Re-regulation following the 2008 financial crisis halted this rapid growth, and the industry shifted from PI-MMFs to government institutional MMFs. We conjecture that this dialectical process will continue, and the decline of the PI-MMF may engender a shift toward structurally similar products, like stablecoins.

Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms

Journal of Finance 1990 45(1), 113
Hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm's net worth diverges from its economic value. Such unbooked capital has on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet sources. This paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants. In effect, the analysis expands the two-index model by endogenizing the market and interest-rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet elements. For a sample of banks during 1975–1985, the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital.

Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms

Journal of Finance 1990 45(1), 113-136
Hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm's net worth diverges from its economic value. Such unbooked capital has on‐balance‐sheet and off‐balance‐sheet sources. This paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants. In effect, the analysis expands the two‐index model by endogenizing the market and interest‐rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on‐balance‐sheet and off‐balance‐sheet elements. For a sample of banks during 1975–1985, the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital.

Pay for Performance? CEO Compensation and Acquirer Returns in BHCs

Review of Financial Studies 2011 24(2), 439-472
We examine how managerial incentives affect acquisition decisions in the banking industry. We find that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) leads to value-enhancing acquisitions. Banks whose CEOs have higher PPS have significantly better abnormal stock returns around the time of the acquisition announcements. On average, acquirers in the high-PPS group outperform their counterparts in the low-PPS group by 1.4% in a three-day window around the announcement. Higher PPS helps reduce the incentives for making value-destroying acquisitions, while at the same time promotes value-enhancing acquisitions. The positive market reaction can be rationalized by post-merger performance. Following acquisitions, banks with higher PPS experience greater improvements in their operating performance. We show that the effect of PPS is mainly evident in small and medium-sized banks, but is not present in large banks. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Pricing the risk of recovery in default with absolute priority rule violation

Journal of Banking & Finance 2003 27(6), 1001-1025
This paper proposes a simple approach to infer the risk-neutral density of recovery rates implied by the prices of the debt securities of a firm. The proposed approach is independent of modeling default arrival rates and allows for the violation of absolute priority rule. The paper demonstrates that a new statistic, the adjusted relative spread, captures risk-neutral recovery information in debt prices. Interest rates and firm tangible assets are shown to be significant determinants of the price of recovery. An application illustrates the pricing of credit derivatives written on the realized recovery rate.