Recent empirical findings by Elsas, 2005, Degryse and Ongena, 2007 document a U-shaped effect of market concentration on relationship lending which cannot be easily accommodated by the investment and strategic theories of bank lending orientation. In this paper, we suggest that this non-monotonicity can be explained by looking at the organizational structure of local credit markets. We provide evidence that marginal increases in interbank competition are detrimental to relationship lending in markets where large and out-of-market banks are predominant. By contrast, where relational lending technologies are already widely in use in the market by a large group of small mutual banks, an increase in competition may drive banks to further cultivate their extensive ties with customers.

Bank deregulation and progress in information technology altered the geographical diffusion of banking structures and instruments, and reduced operational distance between banks and local economies. Although, the consolidation of the banking industry promoted the geographical concentration of banking decision-making centres and increased functional distance between local banking systems and local borrowers. This paper focuses on the impact that these spatial diffusion-concentration phenomena had on the financing constraints of Italian firms over the period 1996–2003. Our findings show that greater functional distance stiffened financing constraints, especially for small firms, while smaller operational distance did not always enhance credit availability.

This paper investigates whether firms’ access to credit is characterized by state dependence. We introduce a first-order Markov model of credit restriction with sample selection that makes it possible to identify state dependence in presence of unobserved heterogeneity. The results, based on a representative sample of Italian firms, show that state dependence in access to credit is a statistically and economically significant phenomenon and that this is more prominent among medium-large firms.

We analyze the heterogeneous employment effects of financial shocks using a rich data set of job contracts, matched with the universe of firms and their lending banks in one Italian region. To isolate the effect of the financial shock, we construct a firm-specific time-varying measure of credit supply. The preferred estimate indicates that the average elasticity of employment to a credit supply shock is 0.36. Adjustment affects both the extensive and the intensive margins and is concentrated among workers with temporary contracts. We also examine the heterogeneous effects of the credit crunch by education, age, gender and nationality. Received January 27, 2017; editorial decision December 1, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

This paper offers novel evidence on the impact of raising bank capital requirements on lending in an emerging market and explores heterogeneous effects, depending on bank characteristics and economic conditions. Using quarterly bank-level data and exploiting the adoption of bank-specific capital buffers, we find that higher capital requirements are associated with lower credit growth in Peru. But the effect is short-lived and becomes insignificant in about half a year. The impact of capital requirements varies with economic conditions and bank characteristics. The effects is stronger during periods of lower economic growth. Weaker (less profitable, less capitalized and less liquid) banks react more to changes in capital requirements. Our findings are robust to estimating a variety of specification to address concerns about the endogeneity of capital requirements.

We show that negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has expansionary effects on credit supply through a portfolio rebalancing channel. By shifting down and flattening the yield curve, NIRP differs from rate cuts just above the zero-lower-bound and has effects similar to QE. For identification, we exploit ECB’s NIRP and the Italian credit register and, for external validity, European and U.S. datasets. NIRP affects more banks with higher ex-ante liquid assets, including net interbank positions. More exposed banks reduce liquid assets, expand credit supply, especially to financially-constrained firms, and cut loan rates, inducing firms to increase investment and the wage bill.

The COVID-19 pandemic could result in large government interventions in the banking industry. To shed light on the possible consequences on markups, we rely on the experience of the Global Financial Crisis and exploit granular data on government interventions in more than 800 banks across 27 countries between 2007 and 2017. Using a multivariate matching method, we find no evidence of an increase in markups. Interventions—especially longer and larger ones—have no significant impact on prices but they increase costs, mostly because of higher loan impairment charges, lowering markups.

A large-scale microcredit expansion program—together with a credit bureau accessible to all lenders—can enable unbanked borrowers to build a credit history, facilitating their transition to commercial banks. Loan-level data from Rwanda show the program improved access to credit and reduced poverty. A sizable share of first-time borrowers switched to commercial banks, which cream-skim less risky borrowers and grant them larger, cheaper, and longer-maturity loans. Switchers have lower default risk than nonswitchers and are not riskier than other bank borrowers. Switchers also obtain better loan terms from banks compared with first-time bank borrowers without a credit history.